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The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act and the Defense of
Non-Paternity: A Functional Analysis
By RICHARD P. PERNA*
INTRODUCTION
In 1950, the Commissioners on Uniform State Law enacted
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act [hereinafter
URESA (1958 version) or RURESA (1968 version)]' in an at-
tempt to aid the enforcement of support obligations between
persons residing in separate states.2 This Act, currently law in
every state of the United States, 3 attempts to provide an inex-
pensive and efficient enforcement mechanism 4 for the collection
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A. 1971,
Villanova University; J.D. 1975, Villanova University School of Law.
I This Act was amended in 1958 and revised in 1968. Both versions are currently
being used. See UN i. REcIPROcAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9A U.L.A. 747
(1958) [hereinafter cited as URESA]; UNiF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT,
9A U.L.A. 647 (1968) [hereinafter cited as RURESA].
2 "The Act is concerned solely with the enforcement of the already existing duties
when the person to whom a duty is owed is in one state and the person owing the duty
is in another. .. " RURESA, 9A U.L.A. 644 commissioner's prefatory notes (1973).
See also In re Marriage of Ciganovich, 132 Cal. Rptr. 261 (Ct. App. 1976); Banks v.
McMorris, 121 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 871 (1975).
The Act can also be used for the collection of spousal support. In addition,
RURESA has a provision that permits its intrastate use where the parties reside in
different counties. See RURESA § 33, 9A U.L.A. 644 (1979). The enforcement mech-
anism for an intrastate URESA action is the same as that in the interstate URESA
action. See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
For a list of states adopting a version of the Act, see RURESA, 9A. U.L.A.
340 (Supp. 1985) (table of jurisdictions adopting RURESA); URESA, 9A U.L.A. 392
(Supp. 1985) (table of jurisdictions adopting URESA).
New York and Iowa have laws which are similar in operation and effect. See
N.Y. [DoM. REL.] LAW §§ 30-43 (McKinney 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 252A.1 to -. 19
(West 1969).
1 Professor Fox describes the operation of the Act as a "simple, cheap, expedient
mechanism." Fox, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 12 FAM. L.Q.
113, 133 (1978). "URESA is designed to provide an inexpensive, simplified and effective
means whereby an obligee in one state can enforce the duties of support owed by an
obligor in another state." Clarkston v. Bridge, 539 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Or. 1975).
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of child support. The most unique aspect of the Act is the so-
called "Two State Lawsuit' '-the procedural mechanism by which
a support action may be initiated in one state and tried and
adjudicated in another,5 thus relieving the initiating party of the
necessity of traveling to a distant state to obtain jurisdiction
over the support obligor. Invoking this procedure, a mother can
institute and adjudicate a support action against an absent father
without leaving her home state.
6
From the inception of the federal child support enforcement
program, URESA and RURESA have remained the backbone
of the program's interstate enforcement efforts.7 As our society
becomes increasingly mobile, we can anticipate that the interstate
enforcement of the support obligation will become an even more
important aspect of the continuing war against "absent fathers."
Given the rising number of out-of-wedlock births, we can also
expect that more and more mothers will face the necessity of
enforcing the father's support obligation in the courtroom.8
However, many of these mothers must overcome an additional
hurdle-proof of the child's paternity. 9
Currently, an unwed mother seeking to establish paternity in
an interstate action faces a judicial tangle. While many states
have recently enacted long-arm statutes that are of help in ob-
taining jurisdiction over nonresident putative fathers, these stat-
utes are only useful when conception occurred in the forum
state.'0 Thus, if the mother resides in a state other than the one
The Act is intended to operate as a procedural enforcement mechanism only
and purports to create no substantive right to support. RURESA, 9A U.L.A. 643
commissioner's prefatory note (1973).
6 See note 21 infra and accompanying text for a detailed description of the actual
procedure that allows a mother to enforce the support obligation without leaving her
home state.
See Fox, supra note 4, at 123.
' Recent statistics compiled by the National Center For Health Statistics show
that the rate of out-of-wedlock births rose from 10.7% in 1970 to 17.1% in 1979-a
50% increase in raw number from 400,000 to 600,000. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEPT. OF COMmmRCE, CDS-80-7, Changing Family Composition and Income Dif-
ferentials (1982).
9 The obligation to support a child generally arises by virtue of parentage. See,
e.g., Trustees of Bloomfield v. Trustees of Chagrin, 5 Ohio 315, 318 (Hammond 1832)
(no duty to support spouse's child from prior marriage); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §
3109.05 (Page 1980).
"o See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 7007(b) (West 1983) ("A person who has
sexual intercourse in this state thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
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in which conception occurred, or in a state that does not provide
for long-arm personal jurisdiction over absent putative fathers,
she has no alternative except the URESA action. However,
URESA is silent concerning its use to establish paternity, and
courts are not uniform in their interpretation of the Act regard-
ing this issue. This lack of uniformity is best exemplified by
contrasting the different treatment accorded two similarly situ-
ated mothers pursuing absent putative fathers for child support.
In one case, an unwed mother initiated a URESA support
action in West Virginia- on behalf of her infant child against a
putative father residing in Ohio." In the Ohio court, the putative
father admitted to having engaged in sexual intercourse with the
petitioner and to sending her some money, but he denied being
the father of the child. 12 The Ohio court dismissed the support
action, finding that the petitioner must first pursue "the legal
procedure to determine the paternity of this child, and that
cannot be done under the Uniform Support of Dependents Act.'
' 3
Denied the benefit of URESA and unable to obtain jurisdiction
in West Virginia over the out-of-state putative father, the mother
must travel to Ohio to litigate the paternity question, the precise
result that the drafters of URESA sought to avoid.'
4
In another case, an identical URESA support action was
brought by an unwed mother residing in the State of Washing-
ton. 15 The putative father, living in Oregon, filed a motion to
quash service and demurrer to the complaint alleging that the
state as to an action brought under [California's Uniform Parentage Act] with respect
to a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse."); Ky. RFv. STAT.
§ 454.210(2)(a)(8) (Baldwin Supp. 1984). In addition, courts in some other states have
found a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over nonresident putative fathers in
their state's general long-arm statute. See, e.g., Backora v. Balkin, 485 P.2d 292 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1971) (construing ARiz. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)). See generally Annot., 76 A.L.R.3d
708 (1977 & Supp. 1984) (discussion of cases on the use of long-arm statute in filiation
and support proceeding); Levy, Asserting Jurisdiction over Nonresident Putative Fathers
in Paternity Actions, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 207, 208-13 (1976) (discussion of long-arm
statutes and cases construing them). See also Uniform Parentage Act, 9A U.L.A. 307
(Supp. 1985) (table of jurisdictions adopting Act).
See Smith v. Smith, 224 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1965).
224 N.E.2d at 926.
13 See id. at 927. Subsequent to this decision, Ohio enacted § 27 of RURESA
which specifically authorizes paternity adjudication in the context of a URESA action.
See note 98 infra and accompanying text.
', See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
See Clarkston v. Bridge, 539 P.2d 1094 (Or. 1975).
URESA
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Oregon court lacked jurisdiction to establish paternity. Unlike
the Ohio court which dismissed the URESA action, the Supreme
Court of Oregon held, on appeal, that in a URESA support
action "the statutory authority to establish paternity in that
proceeding seems clearly implied.' 1 6 Thus, the Washington
mother escaped the dilemma facing her West Virginia counter-
part.
Attempting to eliminate this "jurisdictional" problem, the
1968 version of the Act, RURESA, specifically addresses the
paternity issue:
If the obligee asserts as a defense that he is not the father of
the child for whom support is sought and it appears to the
court that the defense is not frivolous, and if both of the
parties are present at the hearing or the proof required in the
case indicates that the presence of either or both of the parties
is not necessary, the court may adjudicate the paternity issue.
Otherwise the court may adjourn the hearing until the paternity
issue has been adjudicated.
17
Unfortunately, section 27 does little to actually remedy the
paternity controversy in URESA actions. While section 27 clar-
ifies the pre-1968 confusion concerning the "jurisdictional" au-
thority of a court to hear the paternity issue, the grant of
jurisdiction is merely permissive and not mandatory.'8 Further-
more, the statutory language concerning when a court should
adjudicate the paternity question is ambiguous at best. The
requirement that both parties be present unless either or both
are not necessary is particularly problematic. If a mother must
travel to the home state of the father she loses the primary
advantage of URESA-support enforcement without need to
leave her home state. Yet, a mother benefits from URESA only
when her presence in the responding state is "not necessary."
When is the presence of the mother in a paternity case "not
necessary"? 9 The Act itself is of little help, and there are no
reported cases which address this narrow issue. Nor does the
16 Id. at 1097.
'7 RURESA § 27, 9A U.L.A. 730.
"rTihe court may adjudicate the paternity issue.... [T]he court may adjourn
the hearing until the paternity issue has been adjudicated." RURESA § 27, 9A U.L.A.
730 (1979) (emphasis added).
1" One commentator suggests that it is only the "rare" paternity case in which the
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Act suggest procedural guidelines for litigating the complex ques-
tion of paternity in a two-state proceeding.
The remainder of this Article examines the problems asso-
ciated with interstate paternity adjudication and suggests stand-
ards and procedures that not only allow for increased use of the
URESA interstate lawsuit to establish paternity, but also protect
the due process rights of men who may be "falsely accused of
paternity in the vigorous pursuit of the federal child support
enforcement program. '"20
I. THE PROCEDURE-THE Two-STATE LAWSUIT
URESA creates a unique procedural mechanism for the in-
terstate adjudication of support claims. The civil enforcement
procedure,2 ' which has remained essentially unchanged since the
original 1950 version of the Act, allows a plaintiff to prosecute
a claim against the defendant in a foreign state without leaving
her home state courtroom. This two-state proceeding is initiated
by either the mother22 (obligee)23 or by a state or political sub-
mother's presence is not necessary. See H. KRAusE, CRmID SUPPORT iN AMERICA: Tim
LEoAL PERSPECTrvE 205 (1981). Another adds that "[t]he presence of Section 27 in
RURESA is a step toward improvement, but it may prove to be so narrowly drafted
that it forecloses the possibility of a paternity determination in its very terms." Fox,
supra note 4, at 127.
11 H. KRAUSE, supra note 19, at 208. Professor Krause cites the problem of false
accusation as one of a number of reasons supporting the need for general reform in the
paternity area. See id.
23 In addition to the civil enforcement mechanism, the Act also contains criminal
enforcement provisions which have been a part of the Act since its inception. Sections
5 and 6 of URESA provide for the criminal extradition of persons charged with criminal
nonsupport in specified circumstances. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 53 Cal. Rptr. 642 (Ct.
App. 1966).
= Section 13 of RURESA specifically allows an action on behalf of a child to be
brought by the person with legal custody without appointment as guardian ad litem.
RURESA § 13, 9A U.L.A. 686.
" The Act creates its own vocabulary. There are four important terms that are
frequently used. The "obligee" is any person to whom a duty of support is owed and
a state or political subdivision thereof. URESA § 2(f), 9A U.L.A. 656. The obligee is
almost always the mother and/or the state welfare department that has furnished support
to the mother and/or child. "Obligor" refers to any person owing a duty of support.
URESA § 2(g), 9A U.L.A. 656. This is almost always the husband and/or (putative)
father. The "initiating state" is "any state in which a proceeding pursuant to this or a
substantially similar reciprocal law is commenced." URESA § 2(d), 9A U.L.A. 656. The
initiating state is usually the home state of the wife/mother. The "responding state" is
"any state in which the proceeding pursuant to the proceeding in the initiating state is
1984-851
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division that has paid support to her.24 She initiates the action
by filing a petition in the appropriate court in her home state. 
5
Throughout the proceeding she is represented by a prosecuting
attorney or other designated representative also in her home
state.26 Once the petition is filed, the plaintiff's court (initiating
court) reviews the petition to determn'4 e whether it contains the
necessary allegations that the obligor actually owes a duty of
support and to determine whether the responding court can
obtain jurisdiction over the obligor. 27 The court then forwards
the petition to the appropriate court in the defendant's home
state (responding court).28 The responding court assigns the case
to a prosecuting attorney who serves process on the defendant
to obtain jurisdicton over him. 29 The responding court is then
requested to set a time and date for a hearing at which the
obligor may appear and present his testimony.30 The obligee
remains in her home state throughout the proceeding.
Often, the entire controversy ends in settlement with the
obligor agreeing to pay the weekly support demanded.3 1 In other
cases, when the obligor admits his duty or offers no real defense
or may be commenced." URESA § 2(c), 9A U.L.A. 656. This is usually the home state
of the husband/(putative) father.
24 A state or political subdivision stands in the shoes of an obligee for the "purpose
of securing reimbursement for support furnished and of obtaining continuing support."
RURESA § 8, 9A U.L.A. 675.
URESA § 11, 9A U.L.A. 681.
2 Section 12 of the Act mandates that counsel be appointed for the obligee: "[Tihe
prosecuting attorney upon the request of the court [a state department of welfare, a
county commissioner, an overseer of the poor, or other local welfare officer] shall
represent the obligee in any proceeding under this Act ... ." RURESA § 12, 9A U.L.A.
683. Cf. Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1953) (upholding constitutionality of
similar section in earlier act).
" RURESA § 14, 9A U.L.A. 688. The court in the initiating state in effect makes
a determination that the obligor has made out a prima facie case. See, e.g., Martin v.
Coffey, 268 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978). As to the determination that the
responding court can obtain jurisdiction over the obligor, the court in the initiating state
need only determine that the obligor resides in the responding state.
- URESA § 14, 9A U.L.A. 688.
URESA § 18, 9A U.L.A. 694.
- URESA § 18(b), 9A U.L.A. 694.
1, As suggested by Brockelbank and Infausto, the obligor, "[d]espite popular
belief .... is often a good fellow, and not the determined defaulter seeking only to
escape his family obligations." W. BROCKELBANK & F. INFAUSTO, INTERSTATE ENFORCE-
MENT OF FAmnmy SUPPORT 52 (2d ed. 1971).
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to the underlying support obligation, the responding court need
only set the amount of support.3 2 To do so, the court evaluates
both the child's need and the ability of each party to contribute
toward the child's support.3 3 Because of the relative simplicity
of these issues, this determination will rarely require a full ad-
versarial contest.
The responding court may be able to receive evidence of the
child's need and of the mother's financial situation in the form
of affidavits. 4 The father then presents to the responding court
his testimony and any other supporting evidence regarding his
financial condition and ability to pay.35 After hearing the evi-
dence, the responding court sets the amount of support and
subsequently acts as its transmittal agency for the weekly support
payments.3 6 The presence of the mother is normally not necessary
in these cases.
However, when the father raises any defense to the under-
lying support obligation a more troublesome situation arises.
Upon the assertion of a defense the Act allows the court, at the
request of either party, to continue the matter for presentation
of further evidence. 37 Section 20 of RURESA specifically con-
,, See Fox, supra note 4, at 129:
Moreover, obligors rarely have evidence which constitutes a defense or
contravenes the assertions of the obligee. URESA hearings are typically
open-and-shut matters, partly because there is often no factual dispute and
partly because obligors often appear without counsel and, thus, are seldom
able to construct a proper legal defense.
Id. See also W. BROCKELBANK & F. INFAUSTO, supra note 31, at 51.
" Since URESA does not establish the substantive duty of support, the responding
court applies its own state law. See URESA 7, 9A U.L.A. 672. Though jurisdictions
differ, the factors cited in the text are usually considered in determining the amount of
support. See, e.g., Davidson v. Davidson, 405 P.2d 261, 265 (Wash. 1965).
1' The petition and accompanying affidavit are normally not admissible in evidence.
See Way v. Fisher, 425 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). However, admission
may be had if the rules of evidence in the responding state so permit or if agreed to by
the obligor. See generally W. BROCKELBANK & F. IINFAusro, supra note 31, at 52-53.
However, when the action is initiated by a mother receiving AFDC, as a practical matter
her income is easily established.
11 Though not specified by the Act, counsel for the obligee may prove much of
the case by admissions of the obligor obtained by examining the obligor "as-of-cross."
See W. BROCKELBANK & F. I NAusTo, supra note 31, at 53.
RURESA § 28-29, 9A U.L.A. 732, 733.
17 The original Act and its 1952 Amendments were ambiguous as to how a court
should proceed in the face of a defense. Because of the confusion that followed, § 21
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templates that additional evidence will be adduced, either by
deposition of the mother or by her appearance in person. 38
If a defense is raised and the obligee can afford to make a
personal appearance in the responding state, the procedural and
evidentiary problems are eliminated. However, the obligee will
seldom have sufficient money to travel to the responding state
in order to prosecute her claim. 39 In this more common scenario,
the obligee is limited to a "paper" presentation of her case in
the responding court since she never leaves her home state. The
obligor is deprived of the benefit of a face-to-face cross-exami-
nation and confrontation of his accuser, and the court has no
opportunity to hear live in-court testimony from both parties.
In theory, this "hearing" procedure poses significant prob-
lems for both parties and has been described by one commen-
tator as the "weakest link" in the interstate enforcement scheme. 40
However, despite the theoretical problems, in practice the pro-
cedure is rarely disadvantageous to either party. Defenses to the
of the 1958 Amended Act was changed to require a court to "continue the case for
further hearing and the submission of evidence by both parties" once a defense was
asserted. This section of the 1958 Act contemplated the use of depositions and interro-
gatories to obtain evidence from the absent plaintiff. See 9A U.L.A. 748 commissioner's
prefatory note (1958). This procedure remains essentially unchanged today. See note 38
infra.
3 Section 20 of RURESA provides:
If the obligee is not present at the hearing and the obligor denies owing
the duty of support alleged in the petition or offers evidence constituting
a defense the court, upon request of either party, [sic] continue the hearing
to permit evidence relative to the duty to be adduced by either party by
deposition or by appearing in person before the court. The court may
designate the judge of the initiating court as a person before whom a
deposition may be taken.
RURESA § 20, 9A U.L.A. 700.
The procedure under the 1958 version is virtually identical, though the scope of
the evidence to be presented is arguably narrower than that of RURESA. RURESA
allows the presentation of evidence relative to "the duty of support" while § 21 of
URESA limits the scope of the inquiry to "evidence which constitutes a defense." In
practice the distinction is probably without significance. See Fox, supra note 4, at 125.
39 Fox, supra note 4, at 114.
40 Id. at 128.
41 See, e.g., Byrd v. Byrd, 421 A.2d 878, 880 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980) (defendant
in URESA action not entitled to reduction of support order where unemployment is
1984-85] URESA
enforcement of an existing support obligation are limited and
usually focus on the unique circumstances of the obligor41 or of
the child.42 In these cases, the cross-examination of the obligee
will rarely be necessary to the effective presentation of the ob-
ligor's case. 43 Nor will the obligee's case be prejudiced by the
Act's hearing procedure, since her testimony can be adequately
presented in the responding court in the form of a deposition
taken by the initiating court.44
While some accuracy may be lost because of this procedure,
the loss is not significant when the interests at stake are com-
pared to the benefits gained by use of the two-state procedure.
4
1
However, the same conclusion is not so easily reached when the
obligor challenges the existence of the support obligation by
denying paternity of the child. There, the issue for adjudication
is not how much support should be paid, but the filiation of the
child-a finding having more significant consequences for both
father and child.46
voluntary); Martin v. Martin, 430 N.E.2d 962, 963-64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (father's
remarriage a factor in determination of a change in support order); McEvily v. McEvily,
437 A.2d 1110, 1111 (Vt. 1981) (prior support order reduced in RURESA action due to
defendant's inability to pay).
41 See, e.g., Nabors v. Nabors, 354 So. 2d 277, 279 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (father
entitled to credit against child support payments when teenage children work steadily
and contribute to their own support); Lachney v. Lachney, 399 So. 2d 731, 735 (La.
Ct. App. 1981) (husband's duty to pay child support suspended during time child resided
with him); Byrd v. Byrd, 69 N.E.2d 75, 78 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945) (adoption of child
terminates support obligation).
41 The credibility of the mother will rarely be at issue in most situations in which
defendants raise a defense since her testimony is often not relevant. Even when the focus
is on her improved condition, e.g., better employment, remarriage, etc., the Act's normai
procedures are sufficient to insure an accurate assessment of the changes. See notes 32-
35 supra and accompanying text.
" See note 38 supra. See also W. BROCKELBANK & F. INFAUSTO, supra note 31, at
52-55.
45 The following view about the hearing procedure seems to be shared by other
commentators: "In order to have the benefit of arms-length enforcement which does
not require the obligee to travel, the responding court must sacrifice some of the accuracy
and efficiency which characterize a conventional in-person proceeding." Fox, supra note
4, at 129.
'6 See note 143 infra and accompanying text.
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II. TiE STATUTORY DuEMmA
A. URESA Pre-1968
The 1958 version of URESA is silent concerning a court's
authority to adjudicate paternity in an interstate proceeding. In
light of this silence, a number of courts have addressed the
question. Unfortunately, there has been no unanimity regarding
the meaning of the Act's silence.
The minority of the courts addressing the issue have refused
to adjudicate paternity questions raised in a URESA action.47
For example, in Smith v. Smith,41 an Ohio court held that
URESA could not be used to establish the paternity of a child
where "there [had] been no judicial determination of paternity
... under the laws of Ohio or any other state."' 49 The Ohio
court found that the petitioner, before resorting to the URESA
support action, must first determine paternity of the child pur-
suant to the existing Ohio statutory scheme-a requirement she
could not meet without traveling to Ohio.5 0 In addressing the
same question in analogous cases, other courts have reached a
similar result.-"
Although not clearly reasoned, these cases seem to suggest a
narrow interpretation of section 7 of URESA which allows a
person to invoke the Act to enforce only those support obliga-
tions "imposed or imposable" by law. 2 One commentator em-
- See, e.g., Nye v. District Court for County of Adams, 450 P.2d 669, 670 (Colo.
1969); Aquilar v. Holcomb, 395 P.2d 998, 999 (Colo. 1964); Martha D. v. Ronald C.
D., 416 N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979); Sabrina D. v. Thomas W., 443
N.Y.S.2d 111, 112 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981); Spong v. Eckelberger, 393 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977); Smith v. Smith, 224 N.E.2d 925, 927 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1965);
Luedtke v. Koopsma, 303 N.W.2d 112, 114 (S.D. 1981).
4- 224 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1965).
49 Id. at 927.
- The then applicable Ohio Bastardy Statute allowed the bastardy action to be
commenced in Ohio against a resident domiciled in Ohio. See Onio REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 3111.01-.24 (Page 1960). This action was the only one available to the plaintiff in
Smith as West Virginia had no long-arm statute which allowed for jurisdiction over the
nonresident putative father. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
SI See cases cited supra note 47.
51 "Duties of support applicable under this Act are those imposed under the laws
of any state where the obligee was present for the period during which support is sought.
[Vol. 73
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braces this reasoning in pre-1968 URESA cases and argues that
a duty of support imposed or imposable by law within the
meaning of section 7 of the Act, arises only "where there is
already an order of support issued by the first forum state...
[or] where paternity has been acknowledged or established ju-
dicially and the forum state has a law requiring support. '53 He
argues that to allow the URESA support action to continue on
the petitioner's mere allegation of paternity invokes an "artificial
merger of support and paternity actions. ' 54 To fully accept this
interpretation of the Act, however, one must be willing to accept
a distinction between the use of URESA to enforce an already
existing support obligation and its use to establish the underlying
obligation itself-a distinction that seems overly restrictive, es-
pecially in light of the broad remedial purpose of the legisla-
tion. 5-
There are currently thirteen states which still use the pre-
1968 version of URESA with no statutory provision for the
adjudication of paternity. 6 At least half of these states, without
specific case authority, still refuse to allow adjudication of pa-
ternity in a URESA action5 7 and immediately halt the URESA
action upon assertion of a non-paternity defense.
5 8
The majority of courts addressing this question have adopted
a more desirable approach. These better reasoned decisions take
a broader, less restrictive view of section 7 and conclude that
The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state during the period
to which support is sought until otherwise shown." URESA § 7, 9A U.L.A. 767.
" Levy, supra note 10, at 215.
" Id.
" See notes 4-5 supra. See also Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Halsey v. Autry,
441 A.2d 1056, 1058-59 (Md. 1982); Scott v. Sylvester, 257 S.E.2d 774, 776 (Va. 1979),
cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 395. (1983).
56 The following states, which have adopted the 1958 version of URESA, make
no mention of paternity in their legislation: Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
and Washington. See 9A U.L.A. 392 for relevant statutory cites. The total is raised to
15 states when including Iowa and New York, neither of which has a provision in its
reciprocal law specifically authorizing the adjudication of paternity. See N.Y. [DoM.
REL.] LAW §§ 30-43 (McKinney 1977); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 252A.1 to -. 19 (1969).
"See NATIONAL RECInROCAL AND FAMILy SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL ROSTER AND URESA/IV-D REFERRAL GuIDE 138 [hereinafter cited as NA-
TIONAL RosmaR].
59 See id.
URESA
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the adjudication of paternity is well within the scope of the
URESA support proceeding. 9 For example, the Supreme Court
of Oregon in Clarkston v. Bridge6O determined that URESA
"authorizes both the finding and enforcement of duties of sup-
port which have not been previously established in another pro-
ceeding. ' 6' The court reasoned that implicit in every
determination of support is the finding that the defendant is the
father of the child in question. 62 As a necessary part of the
support order, jurisdiction to determine paternity is implied
whenever there is jurisdiction to determine support. 63
In arriving at this conclusion, the court emphasized the broad
remedial purpose of the Act and for support turned to commen-
tary by Professor Brockelbank, chairperson of the committee
which drafted the original URESA. 64 In his view, courts which
have jurisdiction to determine paternity should not hesitate to
do so in a URESA case, because otherwise courts would give
defendants an incentive to deny parentage in order to avoid the
support obligation.
65
In Yetter v. Commeau66 the Supreme Court of Washington
reached the same result as did the court in Clarkston v. Bridge.67
Seizing upon the commissioner's prefatory note to the 1968
19 See Harris v. Kinard, 443 A.2d 25 (D.C. 1982); Chapman v. Sutton, 4 FAm. L.
RaP. (BNA) 2707 (D.C. 1978); Moody v. Christiansen, 306 N.W.2d 775, 777 (Iowa
1981); Stearns v. Kean, 303 N.W.2d 408 (Iowa 1981); Wahl v. Walsh, 304 P.2d 525,
528 (Kan. 1956); Lambrou v. Berna, 148 A.2d 697, 701 (Me. 1959); M. v. W., 227
N.E.2d 469, 471 (Mass. 1967); Lee v. Lee, 442 N.Y.S. 2d 904, 905 (N.Y. Faro. Ct.
1981); Moore v. Moore, 373 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (App. Div. 1975); Brondum v. Cox,
232 S.E.2d 687, 691 (N.C. 1977); Smith v. Burden, 228 S.E.2d 662, 664 (N.C. Ct. App.
1976); Wahlers v. Frey, 288 N.W.2d 29 (Neb. 1980); Clarkston v. Bridge, 539 P.2d
1094, 1096 (Or. 1975); Sardonis v. Sardonis, 261 A.2d 22, 23 (R.I. 1970); Brown v.
Thomas, 426 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tenn. 1968); Guerra v. DeLuna, 526 S.W.2d 225, 226
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Yetter v. Commeau, 524 P.2d 901, 904 (Vash. 1974).
10 539 P.2d 1094 (Or. 1975).
6, Id. at 1096.
Id. at 1096-97.
63 Id. at 1097.
Id. (quoting with approval W. BROCKELBANK & F. INFAUSTO, supra note 31, at
62).
65 W. BROCKELBANK & F. INFAUSTO, supra note 31, at 62. See also Fox, supra
note 4, at 126-27.
524 P.2d 901, 903-04 (Wash. 1974).
67 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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Amendments to the Act, 68 the court interpreted the subsequent
addition of section 27 to RURESA merely as an attempt to
clarify the procedures for use in the event of a non-paternity
defense. The addition of section 27 was seen to create only a
procedural mechanism for adjudication of an issue already within
the jurisdictional power of a URESA responding court.
69
There are currently a small number of jurisdictions which
apparently allow the adjudication of paternity without specific
statutory authority.70 Permitting the adjudication of paternity is
more desirable than a dismissal of the entire URESA support
action, the result mandated by the more restrictive minority
approach.7' As noted previously, a refusal to hear the paternity
defense leaves the petitioner-mother in an almost impossible
bind.72 However, sensitivity to the petitioner's plight should not
mask the potential prejudice faced by the respondent forced to
defend the two-state paternity action.73 Implying a grant of
jurisdiction to determine paternity in the URESA support action
should not result in a wholesale use of URESA paternity actions
which fails to give serious consideration to the sufficiency of
URESA procedures in the paternity context.
Because URESA offers no additional procedural guidance
on the paternity issue, courts adopting the more liberal majority
position must forge their own safeguards to protect the putative
father from any unfairness inherent in the two-state proceeding.
Unfortunately, the few decisions which address the procedural
requirements of the URESA paternity action do so without
sensitivity either to the unique problems created by the Act's
two-state hearing proceeding or to the equally unique nature of
" "The new Act has guidelines for the conduct of the trial in the responding state
(Sections 21 and 23), for cases where paternity is in issue (Section 28 [sic]) or where
there has been interference with visitation rights (Section 24) or where it may be desirable
to take an appeal (Section 35)." RURESA, 9A U.L.A. 644 commissioner's prefatory
note.
See 9A U.L.A. 904.
10 These jurisdictions are Iowa, the District of Columbia, South Carolina, Wash-
ington, Guam, Michigan (local practice), and Texas (local practice). See NATIONAL
ROSTER, supra note 57, at 138.
71 See notes 47-55 supra and accompanying text.
72 See notes 14, 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
73 See text accompanying notes 179-322 infra.
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As early as 1959, courts confronted the thorny procedural
issues presented whenever a respondent denies the paternity of
the child for whom support is sought. In Lambrou v. Berna,
7 5
the Supreme Court of Maine considered the appropriate proce-
dure for Maine courts to follow when the respondent "claims
to have no knowledge of the birth of an alleged dependent child,
and the petitioner is not present to testify. 7 6 The Lambrou
court noted that this problem was one not normally present in
most URESA cases, because the duty of support is usually
established through the testimony of the respondent himself-
eliminating the need for the presence of the petitioner.77 How-
ever, when the respondent denies knowledge of the child, the
testimony of the petitioner takes on added significance. The
court resolved this dilemma by reference to the Act's hearing
procedure, citing Pfueller v. Pfueller,7 8 a New Jersey case in
which paternity was not in issue. Parroting the language of
section 21 of the Act, the Lambrou court concluded that a non-
paternity defense may be adjudicated in a URESA proceeding
by permitting the petitioner to present evidence in person or by
deposition taken in the initiating court.79 However, no attempt
was made to examine the sufficiency of the Act's hearing pro-
cedures in the paternity context.
More recently, the Oregon Supreme Court confronted this
same question in Clarkston v. Bridge.80 The court was asked to
decide whether the respondent in a URESA action had a right
to a jury trial on the question of paternity.8' The court began
its analysis by recognizing the sensitivity of paternity adjudica-
tions and the corresponding legislative policy of providing pro-
cedural protections for the putative father. 2
The court then balanced the legislative policy in providing
74 See text accompanying notes 165-78 infra.
" 148 A.2d 697 (Me. 1959).
76 Id. at 703.
" See id. See also notes 31-36 supra and accompanying text.
78 117 A.2d 32 (N.J. 1955).
79 148 A.2d at 703-04.
90 539 P.2d 1094.
83 See id. at 1095, 1098-1100.
82 See id. at 1099.
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procedural protections in paternity proceedings against the per-
ceived legislative interest in minimizing the additional burdens
and expenses which would otherwise be incurred by an out-of-
state plaintiff. 3 URESA was seen as a remedial statute "designed
to equalize the relative positions of resident and nonresident
plaintiffs in support proceedings. '" 84 The addition of a jury did
not, in the court's view, present greater difficulties for the out-
of-state plaintiff and therefore did not contravene the remedial
purpose of the Act.8 The court.concluded that in the absence
of legislative intent to the contrary, the procedures for establish-
ing paternity in a URESA support action "should parallel those
mandated by the legislature for establishing paternity in other
support proceedings.' '86
In holding that the defendant was entitled to a trial by jury,
87
the court specificaliy declined to determine whether all of the
procedural protections required in an Oregon filiation proceeding
are also available in the URESA proceeding in which paternity
is contested.88 Although the court could not discern any reason
why they should not be available,8 9 the narrowness of the deci-
sion is significant. At best, the court viewed the URESA de-
fendant as standing in the shoes of his non-URESA counterpart
in determining the availability of procedural protections. Unfor-
tunately, no attention was given to the additional procedural
problems facing a URESA defendant in the interstate paternity
contextP ° It is difficult to criticize the result in Clarkston; cer-
tainly the interstate paternity defendant requires the same pro-
cedural protections accorded defendants in a non-URESA filiation
a, See id. at 1099-1100.
9, Id. at 1099.
1' See id. at 1100.
6 Id.
P Id. See also Waddell v. State ex rel. Meeks, 357 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Ark. 1962)
(jury trial allowed); Wahlers v. Frey, 288 N.W.2d 29, 30 (Neb. 1980) (jury trial allowed).
u "While it is unnecessary for us to decide in this case whether all the procedural
protections required in filiation proceedings are applicable in URESA proceedings in
which paternity is contested, we do not discern any reason why they should not be."
539 P.2d at 1100 n.13.
a" See id.
90 See Note, Clarkston v. Bridge: Paternity Determination in Oregon URESA
Proceedings, 12 WruLuTrT L.J. 643 (1976), which criticizes the court's failure to
address the need for procedural guidelines in the URESA paternity case.
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proceeding. However, given the unique problems facing the in-
terstate defendant, a serious question can be raised concerning
the need for additional procedural protections. 91 This more thorny
problem was never considered by the court-much less answered.
The commentary, while considerably more vocal about citing
the need for sensitivity to issues of procedural fairness, offers
little real help in delineating a workable test for determining
when an adjudication hearing is "fair. ' 92 According to Professor
Brocklebank, a court should decide whether to adjudicate the
paternity defense only after "weighing the equities and consid-
ering the convenience and justice to the parties." 93 In his view,
a court is justified in refusing to hear the matter where the
respondent makes a "substantial showing that he is not the
father and it appears that it will be very difficult to conduct
such a trial with the plaintiff not before the court." 94
This test draws a distinction between cases in which the
defendant makes a "substantial" showing of non-paternity and
those in which the defendant's proof is less than "substantial."
Implicit in the distinction is an assumption that the procedural
difficulty in each case is somehow directly related to the strength
of the defendant's claim. 95 The accuracy of this assumption
aside,96 Professor Brocklebank fails to articulate how "substan-
tial" a defendant's claim must be or how "difficult" the conduct
of the trial must appear before a court is justified in refusing to
hear the case.
B. URESA Post-1968: Section 27 of the Revised Act
On the surface, section 27 of RURESA resolves the earlier
jurisdictional problem by specifically authorizing courts to ad-
judicate paternity in the context of the interstate support en-
forcement mechanism. However, section 27 does little to alleviate
91 Id.
92 See H. KRAuSE, supra note 19, passim; Note, supra note 90, at 654-55.
91 W. BROCKELBANK & F. INAUSTO, supra note 31, at 63.
94 Id. (emphasis added).
11 Thus when a paternity defense is "frivolous and can be easily met by a deposition
from the plaintiff, the issue should be accepted and decided as any other issue might
be." Id.
9 See text beginning at note 295 infra.
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the nagging procedural problems inherent in the two-state pa-
ternity proceeding. Although touted as an improvement over
cases allowing paternity adjudications without articulated pro-
cedural standards, 97 section 27 actually does little to inject con-
sistency into the old dilemma.
The section provides that a court may adjudicate paternity
when three conditions are met: (1) the obligor asserts non-
paternity as a defense; (2) the court determines that the defense
is not frivolous; and (3) both parties are present at the hearing,
unless the proof required in the case indicates that the presence
of either or both parties is not necessary.
9 8
The first requirement is clear and nonproblematic. The sec-
ond requirement addresses the validity of the defense and man-
dates that a court hear the paternity issue only when the defense
is not frivolous. This requirement presents a number of problems
since it apparently anticipates at least some minimal form of
judicial review prior to the full paternity adjudication.
In most cases, the fact finder cannot possibly determine the
"frivolousness" of the claim until the parties have had the
opportunity to present some evidence. 99 On its face, section 27
requires a court to make a finding concerning the validity of the
11 "Whatever the shortcomings of RURESA in this context, it probably represents
an improvement over URESA interpretations allowing the adjudication of paternity.
Since Section 27 no more than reflects basic mandates of due process, there would seem
to be little room for further 'improvement."' H. KRAUSE, supra note 19, at 205-06.
" See text accompanying note 17 supra for the text of RURESA § 27.
99 Frivolousness is an elusive concept, especially when used in reference to a
paternity proceeding. In Glover v. Clark, 288 S.E.2d 887 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982), a URESA
case in which the defendant asserted non-paternity as a defense, the court addressed the
meaning of "frivolous" § in 27 and construed the term "to refer to a defense in which
the respondent's realistic chances of ultimate success are slight." Id. at 889 (citations
omitted). The usefulness of this definition is limited-how slight must a defendant's
chance of success be before a court can legitimately refuse to hear the claim? Notwith-
standing the definitional problem, the defense of non-paternity is factually frivolous
only when the defendant is the biological father of the child-the ultimate factual issue
which is the focus of the judicial proceeding. The validity of the defense can normally
be ascertained only by reference to the evidence to be presented by the parties unless
barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. See McNeece v. McNeece, 562 P.2d 767
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (defendant's assertion of non-paternity in URESA action brought
by mother barred by prior divorce decree between the spouses which by implication
determined the paternity of the child); Luedtke v. Koopsma, 303 N.W.2d 112 (S.D.
1981) (paternity not properly raised in an action under URESA when paternity not
contested in original divorce). However, the non-paternity defense may still be non-
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defense before it can hear the paternity claim. The court can
determine the validity of the defense only by hearing the evidence
relevant to the paternity of the child. There is little sense to a
requirement that conditions "adjudication" of the paternity de-
fense upon consideration of the same evidence that will ulti-
mately be dispositive of the entire action.
Although there is no official commentary in the 1968 Amend-
ments on the purposes of the nonfrivolousness requirement, it
is likely that the standard was intended to discourage the wide-
spread use of a potentially costly and time-consuming defense
that would frustrate the central purpose of the Act.10 However,
a strict reading of section 27 actually produces the contrary
result.
The Act allows a court to adjudicate the paternity defense
only when it is not frivolous. When a defendant "frivolously"
raises the defense of non-paternity, the court is precluded from
addressing the paternity issue and section 27 seems to suggest
that the support action be adjourned until the paternity question
is adjudicated elsewhere.101 The converse is obviously more de-
sirable: if a determination of frivolousness can be made, a court
should "hear" the matter to dismiss the defense and judicially
frivolous even in the face of a prior court determination. See Hodge v. Maith, 435 So.
2d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (in URESA action brought by a Pennsylvania mother
against a Florida defendant, the Florida court found that the prior Pennsylvania paternity
judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit because the adjudication violated the
fourteenth amendment due process clause (lacked minimum contacts) and defendant was
allowed a defense of non-paternity); Brondum v. Cox, 232 S.E.2d 687 (N.C. 1977)
(defendant allowed to assert non-paternity defense in URESA action when prior Ha-
waiian judgment was invalid for lack of personal jurisdiction and thus not entitled to
full faith and credit); Smith v. Burden, 228 S.E.2d 662 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (prior
criminal conviction for failure to support illegitimate children not conclusive in subse-
quent civil URESA action and defendant is entitled to have paternity issue litigated in
the civil action). Similarly, even when the defendant was married to the mother at the
time of birth, the presumption of filiation is usually rebuttable. See, e.g., Evans v.
Evans, 434 So. 2d 254 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982), cert. quashed by Ex parte Evans, 434 So.
2d 257 (Ala. 1983). If the frivolous standard has any merit in this context, it should be
limited to only those cases in which the defendant is legally barred from asserting the
defense of non-paternity. See cases cited infra note 102.
'10 See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
101 Even if we interpret "adjudicate" in § 27 to require an evidentiary hearing on
the merits, the confusion is still not eliminated. Certainly no court wants to conduct an
evidentiary hearing if the defense is frivolous on its face. Yet, a court must dismiss a
frivolous defense and in this sense the matter is adjudicated.
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establish the parent-child relationship. °0
The third requirement of section 27-that both parties be
present unless either or both is not necessary-is even more
problematic. It is this prerequisite that led one commentator to
suggest that the section is "so narrowly drafted that it forecloses
the possibility of a paternity determination by its very terms."' 10 3
This dilemma is obvious and distressing.
A mother who resorts to URESA usually does so because
there is no single suitable forum available for adjudication.
Without the two-state enforcement mechanism, a mother faces
the same difficult situation which existed prior to the passage of
URESA.'04 She must first find the putative father and travel
(presumably with the child) to a forum with both subject matter
and personal jurisdiction to litigate her claim.105 Throughout this
period, both she and her child must live without support./°6
Except for a rare case involving parties who live physically
close together but across state lines, a mother will usually be
financially unable to travel to the responding state to prosecute
her support action. 0 7 When a court requires the mother's pres-
ence as a precondition to hearing the defendant's non-paternity
defense, she is effectively barred from pursuing her claim in the
URESA context. 0 8 As a result, the determination of when the
presence of either or both parties is not necessary is of major
significance since only this class of cases will be litigated using
the RURESA scheme. °9
Courts faced with this question can glean little guidance from
the statute itself or from the scant legislative history. Moreover,
no court has fully addressed the issue in spite of the fact that
102 See East v. Pike, 294 S.E.2d 597 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (non-paternity defense in
URESA action frivolous in light of former divorce judgment establishing support and
visitation rights); Ely v. DeRosier, 459 A.2d 280 (N.H. 1983) (hearing on the issue of
paternity in a URESA action available only when the defense not frivolously raised and
no hearing available where prior judgment rendered by sister state is res judicata and
entitled to full faith and credit). See note 295 infra and accompanying text.
"I' Fox, supra note 4, at 127.
,04 Id. at 114.
305 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
116 Id. at 126.
I- See RURESA § 27, 9A U.L.A. 730.
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numerous states have adopted section 27 authorizing the adju-
dication of paternity in the URESA support action."0
Commentary is not very optimistic about resolving the prob-
lem. Writers cite the need for and the importance of live in-
court testimony as a primary reason why only the "rare" pa-
ternity case will not require the presence of both parties."' The
belief (or perhaps assumption) underlying this conclusion is that
paternity adjudication is unlike the ordinary URESA support
action and other civil hearings in which the presence of the
parties is not necessarily required." 2 However, recognizing the
unique nature of the paternity action"3 is only a first step in
110 Section 27 has been adopted verbatim in: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2427
(Supp. 1983); California, CAL. Ciw. PRoc. CODE § 1695 (West 1982); Colorado, CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 14-5-128 (1974); Hawaii, HAWAI REV. STAT. § 576-39.5 (Supp. 1983);
Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1227 (Smith-Hurd 1980); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-476 (1981); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1681 (West 1983); Minnesota,
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 518 C. 18 (West Supp. 1984); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 454.200.3
(Vernon Supp. 1984); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-128 (1983); Nebraska, NEB.
REv. STAT. § 42-788 (1978); Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. § 130.245 (1979); New Hampshire,
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 546:26-a (Supp. 1983); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-
30.49 (West Supp. 1984); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-26 (1978); North
Dakota, N.D. CERT. CODE ANN. § 14-12.1-27 (1981); Ohio, Omio REv. CODE ANN. §
3115.24 (Page 1980); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1600.20d (Vest 1980);
Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6767 (Purdon 1982); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-11-27 (1981); South Dakota, S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. § 25-9A-28 (Supp.
1983); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 415 (1974); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE §
48-9-26 (1980); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 52.10(27) (Vest 1983); and Wyoming,
Wyo. STAT. § 20-4-127 (1984). Several states have adopted section 27 essentially but
with some variations and/or additions. They are: Alaska, AIAsKA STAT. § 25.25.175
(1982) (mentions standard of proof to establish paternity); Arizona, Aiuz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 12-1676 (1982) (includes maternity and corresponding language in the text);
Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 630 (1981) (combines support language); Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 88.235 (West Supp. 1984) (substitutes "respondent" for "obligor");
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-11-66 (1982) (allows paternity issue to be adjudicated by
jury trial if demanded); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 7-1074 (1979) (mentions Idaho procedure
for paternity adjudication); Kentucky, KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 407.410(2) (Baldwin 1983)
(substitutes "shall adjudicate" and "shall continue" for "may adjudicate" and "may
continue" respectively; also adds Kentucky procedural language); North Carolina, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 52A-8.2 (1976) (provides for blood test); and Virginia, VA. CODE 20-
88.26:1 (1983) (details type of evidence to be admitted in adjudication). Maine, an
URESA state, has a paternity section which requires paternity to be determined in
accordance with the Uniform Paternity Act. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 411
(1981).
"I See note 19 supra.
12 See notes 31-46 supra and accompanying text.
113 See text accompanying notes 165-78 infra.
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answering the fundamental question of section 27: When is the
presence of one or both parties not necessary?
In his commentary on section 27, Professor Krause hails the
section's narrowness as an "improvement over URESA interpre-
tations allowing the adjudication of paternity."11' 4 While recog-
nizing the section's limitations, Krause suggests that the section
does no more than reflect "basic mandates of due process."" 5
Unfortunately, Krause leaves his discussion of section 27 without
addressing the specific application of the due process clause to
the interstate adjudication of paternity. It is that question to
which we now turn.
III. PROCEDURAL FAmNEss
A. The Yardstick
The clear purpose of URESA is to allow the enforcement of
support obligations without requiring the mother asserting the
claim to travel to the father's home state.Y6 The fact that every
jurisdiction in the country has adopted the Act or its equivalent
demonstrates legislative intention to provide an efficient and
economic means of assisting a custodial parent in enforcing her
right to child support.1 7 While this goal is not insignificant,"1
8
it must be tempered, in the case of a putative father, by his
right to have the filiation question adjudicated in a manner
consistent with fundamental fairness.Y9
Although the interstate nature of the action can present
procedural difficulties for both litigants, the "decision" to liti-
gate interstate is initially that of the mother and any difficulties
"' H. KRAusE, supra note 19, at 205.
11' Id.
116 See text accompanying notes 1-6 supra.
"' See note 3 supra.
, See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
,, The Supreme Court "frequently has stressed the importance of familial bonds,
whether or not legitimized by marriage, and accorded them constitutional protection.
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972). Just as the termination of such
bonds demands procedural fairness, see Lassiter v. Department of Social Services [452
U.S. 18 (1981)], so too does their imposition." Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981).
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she faces are by "choice."' 120 Unlike the mother, the putative
father is not given the option to completely forego litigation.
When a support action is brought against him he must defend
and, if he defends on the ground that he is not the father, he
must litigate the paternity issue in a two-state proceeding.' 2'
A comparison to intrastate pater-;ty litigation highlights the
additional difficulties the URESA paternity defendant must con-
front when forced to litigate interstate. As a number of courts
have noted, the state's alignment with the mother as the moving
party in a paternity action potentially results in an inherent
unfairness to the defendant. 22 The URESA proceeding exacer-
bates this inherently potential inequity in two ways. First, the
mother is afforded the benefit of not one but two states and an
attorney to prosecute her case,'2 while the putative father does
not necessarily receive similar benefits. 2 4 Second, the putative
father faces the prospect of defending an action in which the
parties reside in separate states perhaps a continent apart. This
distance, and its adverse impact on a putative father's ability to
adequately prepare and present his case, combine to form the
120 In many cases, the mother's choice is illusory at best. See Fox, supra note 4, at
114. In addition, if the child receives assistance through the AFDC program, the decision
to institute the action must be made by the state from which the child receives AFDC.
42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(26)(A) (West 1983) requires an AFDC applicant to "assign the
state any rights to [child] support" to which the child is entitled.
121 Since process in the URESA case is issued by the responding state which vill
acquire personal jurisdiction over the defendant, failure to defend may well result in a
binding default judgment against him. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877);
International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
'1 See, e.g., Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d 226 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900
(1979) (indigent defendants entitled to appointed counsel in paternity proceedings wherein
state appeared on behalf of mother of child); M. v. S., 404 A.2d 653 (N.J. 1979) (court
may require that counsel and scientific testing be provided to indigent defendant without
costs); Madeline G. v. David R., 407 N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1978) (paternity
proceeding controlled by state officials was "state action"; due process required that
indigent defendant be provided counsel at state expense). But see, e.g., Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Heftier, 382 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1980) (no denial of
equal protection by not providing counsel for defendant). See generally Note, The Right
to Appointed Counsel in Paternity Actions, 19 J. FAm . L. 497 (1981-82).
123 See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
124 URESA has no provision for representation for the defendant, and the question
of appointed counsel is governed by the law of the responding state. See notes 160, 334
infra. The right to appointed counsel is by no means uniformly upheld in state courts.
See cases cited supra note 122.
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most common fundamental problem faced by defendants in
URESA paternity actions12
Well-developed constitutional principles establish that "per-
sons forced to settle their claim of right and duty through the
judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.'1 2 6 While there can be no argument about a defendant's
right to a meaningful opportunity to present a defense, proce-
dural safeguards necessary to protect that right are "flexible"
and are to be defined "as a particular situation demands."1 27
To determine the specific dictates of due process in interstate
paternity adjudication we must consider the three elements ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge:18 first,
the private interest at stake; second, the likelihood that the
procedures used will result in an erroneous deprivation of that
private interest; and third, the government's interest, including
the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional procedures
might entail. 129
B. The Parties and Their Interests
In assessing the defendant's need for procedural protection,
we first focus on the parties and the nature of the private
interests at stake in the adjudication of paternity. Their interests
will be examined in the following order: child, father, mother,
and state.
Historically, paternity actions were seen primarily as a mech-
anism to economically benefit society at large. 30 By establishing
a parent-child relationship, the state hoped to shift the economic
125 See text accompanying notes 180-99 infra.
11 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79 (1971).
I" IThe phrase expresses the requirement of "fundamental fairness," a
requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty.
Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise which
must discover what "fundamental fairness" consists of in a particular
situation by first considering any relevant precedents and by then assessing
the several interests that are at stake.
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1980).
M 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
9 Id. at 335.
130 For a history of paternity actions, see H. KaAusE, ILLEGrriMAcY: LAW AND
SocLAL PoLIcY 105 (1971).
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burden of supporting a child from public welfare authorities
back to the family.'13 This attitude is still prevalent, 32 and is the
underlying purpose of the URESA enforcement scheme.133 How-
ever, there is increasing acceptance of the importance of the
paternity action to the child.
34
Since the action is initiated for support, economic issues may
well continue to dominate in the eyes of the litigants and the
court. However, the child's interest in the URESA proceeding
can be paramount, especially considering that, without URESA,
the child faces the dilemma of an inability to establish the parent-
child relationship.
Establishing the parent-child relationship has wide ranging
economic consequences for the child. In addition to receipt of
periodic support payments, a child is often eligible to make
claims against a variety of governmental entitlement and insur-
ance programs. 35 Filiation also affects inheritance rights 36 and
13' Id.
32 "The main object of [the paternity action] is to compel the putative father to
contribute to the support of his illegitimate child to prevent the child from becoming a
public charge." People ex rel. Elkin v. Rimicci, 240 N.E.2d 195, 199 (IMl. App. Ct.
1968) (cited in H. KRAusE, supra note 130, at 105).
13 In the introduction to the second edition of their work on the interstate enforce-
ment of family support, Brockelbank and Infausto suggest that the
phenomenal success of [URESA] can be explained only by the fact that it
holds out a promise of tax relief. The average member of a state legislature
is . .. almost compelled to vote for a law that will bring to boot the
runaway pappy who is neglecting his moral duty to his wife and children,
and at the same time reduces taxes by shifting the burden of relief for
destitute families from the state to the father-husband who should bear it.
W. BROCKELBANK & F. INFAUSTO, supra note 31, at 4-5.
'1 Professor Krause refers to the child in the paternity action as the "principal
plaintiff" and argues for recognition of the primacy of the child's interest. H. KRAUSE,
supra note 130, at 108. See also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981); Note, The
Nature of Paternity Actions, 19 J. FAm. L. 475 (1980-81).
"I See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (social security benefits);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (worker compensation); De
Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (right to new copyright under § 24 of the
Copyright Act); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (public
welfare).
,16 See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upheld New York statute allowing
illegitimate child to inherit from intestate father where a court of competent jurisdiction
has entered an order of filiation during the father's lifetime); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
109(2) (1982) (person born out of wedlock receives intestate share of legimate child if
the parent and child relationship is established under the Uniform Parentage Act).
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the receipt of benefits under state retirement plans. 137
More than economics are at stake for a child. Emotional
and psychological well-being often depend upon a sense of iden-
tity and family history derived from both parents. 138 Given the
importance of the parent-child relationship to the future psycho-
logical and emotional health of the child, it is imperative to
establish that relationship with the real father-not just any man
capable of providing economic support.
139
Recent cases and commentary stress the need to consider the
interest of the child when discussing the procedural sufficiency
of the hearing process. 40 Of particular significance is the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Little v. Streater,141 which held
unconstitutional a Connecticut statute charging costs of blood-
grouping tests in paternity cases to the requesting party. 42 The
statute had been used to deny blood tests to an indigent putative
father. In delivering the opinion for a unanimous Court, Chief
Justice Burger recognized the "creation of a parent-child rela-
tionship" as one of a number of consequences flowing from a
finding of paternity and deserving of constitutional protection.
43
According to Burger, both the putative father and the child
W' See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.542 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980); Omo REV. CODE
AN. § 5505.21 (Page 1970).
"' See H. KRAUSE, supra note 130, at 263 n.14.
"' "It is in the child's interest not only to have it adjudicated that some man is
his or her father and thus liable for support, but to have some assurance that the correct
person has been so identified." Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d 226, 234 (Cal. 1979).
141 "If the child is to have anything, it must have a right to have his paternity
ascertained in a fair and efficient manner." H. KatusE, supra note 130, at 113 (emphasis
in original). See also Note, supra note 134, at 492.
The Senate Finance Committee, in its Report on the 1974 Social Services Amend-
ments to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 654-55 (1982), also recognized that the
child has the primary interest at stake in a paternity action. See S. REP. No. 1356, 93rd
Cong., 2d Session 52 (1974) (cited with approval in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. at 13
n.9).
141 452 U.S. 1.
142 The Court stopped short of mandating state-paid blood tests in all cases. The
decision was premised on (1) the importance of blood tests as exculpatory evidence; (2)
the prominent role of the State of Connecticut in the paternity litigation when the child
is a recipient of AFDC payments; and (3) the unusual nature of the paternity action in
Connecticut, citing the "quasi criminal" nature of the proceeding as well as an unusual
evidentiary obstacle. See id. at 7-10. It is this last factor which may operate to restrict
the general applicability of the holding.
"I Id. at 13.
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share a "compelling interest in the accuracy of such a [paternity]
determination." 144The decision is particularly significant because
of the weight given to the child's interest in the determination
of the putative father's due process rights.
While both child and father share an interest in accuracy,
the consequences to each of an erroneous paternity finding are
markedly different. In the URESA context, a putative father's
interest in accuracy does not necessarily flow from his desire to
establish a genuine long-lasting parent-child relationship..Rather,
his primary concern is to avoid the years of financial obligation
following the finding of paternity.
Even apart from these significant economic interests, the
failure to live up to a court imposed support obligation can
produce other serious consequences for the father, At a mini-
mum, a recalcitrant father faces an action for civil contempt
with the prospect of fine, imprisonment or both. 145 Because of
the potential severity of punishment, both commentators and
courts describe the initial paternity adjudication as "quasi crim-
inal," a view enhanced by the state's active involvement in the
action. 146
Though founded upon different concerns, both the putative
father and the child have a substantial interest in the accuracy
of the paternity proceedings. Whether arrived at through URESA
proceedings or intrastate proceedings, an incorrect finding of
filiation has equally distressing consequences for both.
The interest in accuracy shared by the child and putative
father should be contrasted with the primarily economic interests
' Id.
1" Civil contempt remains the primary enforcement tool used against recalcitrant
fathers. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2705.05 (Page 1981) (jail sentence of up to
10 days and/or fine of up to $500 for each contemptuous act). See generally Note, Due
Process in the Civil Nonsupport Proceeding: The Right to Counsel and Alternatives to
Incarceration, 61 Tax. L. Rav. 291, 309 (1982) (describes common enforcement tech-
niques for collecting child support arrearages). In addition to civil enforcement mecha-
nisms, some states still retain criminal sanctions for nonsupport. See, e.g., Omao REv.
CODE ANN. § 2919.21 (Page 1982) (person found guilty of failing to support minor child
may be punished for first-degree misdemeanor).
1 6 "Although the State [Connecticut] characterizes such proceedings as 'civil,'...
they have 'quasi-criminal overtones.' " Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. at 10 (citations
omitted).
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of the movant mother. Though obviously interested in establish-
ing the correct parent-child relationship, a petitioning mother
has already targeted the URESA obligor as the father of the
child. Her primary interest is in substantiating her claim of
filiation so that the child can benefit economically and otherwise.
However, in many cases, even this economic interest wanes.
When the child is an AFDC recipient, federal law requires as-
signment of any support obligation to the state as a requisite
for receipt of benefits.' 47 The state is federally mandated to
collect the support obligation to offset the cost of public assist-
ance payments to the child.' 4 In these cases, the immediate
economic winner in the support action is the state itself, because
the economic condition of mother and child cannot be improved
unless the amount of support received exceeds the amount of
AFDC received by the child. Only when her child no longer
receives AFDC will the support payments represent a real in-
crease in the family's standard of living.'
49
In assessing the state's interest in the due process equation,
we must be mindful that URESA's unique procedural scheme
involves not one but two states with interests in the proceeding.
As the home state of the child, the URESA initiating state has
This "quasi-criminal" characterization recognizes the potentially severe conse-
quences which flow from paternity. See 452 U.S. at 13. It also recognizes the high level
of state involvement in the "prosecution" of the civil action:
Because appellee's child was a recipient of public assistance, Connecticut
law compelled her . . . "to disclose the name of the putative father under
oath and to institute an action to establish the paternity of said child."
The State's Attorney General automatically became a party to the action,
and any settlement agreement required his approval or that of the Com-
missioner of Human Resources or Commissioner of Income Maintenance.
The state referred this mandatory paternity suit to appellee's lawyer "for
prosecution" and paid his fee as well as all the costs of litigation.
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. at 9 (citations omitted). See also notes 151-52 infra. In the
URESA paternity action, even when the child is not a recipient of AFDC the state
involvement with the action is high. See notes 8-30 supra and accompanying text.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(26) (West 1983). See also 45 C.F.R. § 232.11 (1984).
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 654(4) (West 1983). See also 45 C.F.R. § 232.12 (1984),
,,1 When a state IV-D agency receives support that is sufficient to make the family
financially ineligible for AFDC, the monthly support is first used to repay the state for
the AFDC paid in that month and the remainder is distributed according to 45 C.F.R.
§ 302.51 (1984). Amounts received for the following month must then be paid directly
to the AFDC family. 42 U.S.C.A. § 454(5) (West 1983).
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a legitimate interest in securing paternal support for the child.' °
This interest is especially strong when the child receives public
assistance paid from the initiating state's tax coffers. 15' In con-
trast, the URESA responding state has no direct economic in-
terest in the proceeding. Neither the state nor any of its citizens
immediately stand to gain monetarily as a result of the URESA
action. The responding state's only economic interest would rest
in the prospective benefit its own citizens can receive by resort
to the URESA interstate enforcement mechanism. As a partici-
pant in a cooperative nationwide support enforcement network,
a responding state ultimately benefits economically from a na-
tional increase in support collected interstate.
Both states share the interest in an accurate determination
of paternity-the initiating state because of its obvious concern
for the important interest of its child resident and the responding
state as residence of the putative father. However, both states'
interests are tempered by their concern for fiscal restraint. Both
have strong and obvious interests in keeping costs of the pro-
ceeding as low as possible, and neither state wishes to expend
more than is necessary to finance the action.'
52
The private interests implicated in the URESA paternity
action, like those in the intrastate paternity action, are substan-
tial and require constitutional protection. Given the importance
of the familial rights at stake, the procedure used in the adju-
dicatory process must insure an accurate and just determination
of paternity. Balanced against the private interests are the inter-
ests of two states desiring a proceeding which is just and accurate
as well as economical. Whether the URESA paternity action can
withstand constitutional scrutiny depends primarily upon the risk
that an erroneous determination of paternity will result from the
- "The state admittedly has a legitimate interest in the welfare of a child born
out-of-wedlock who is receiving public assistance, as well as in securing support for the
child from those legally responsible." 452 U.S. at 14. See also note 132 supra and
accompanying text.
"1 452 U.S. at 14. See also In re Paternity of D.A.A.P., 344 N.W.2d 200 (Vis.
Ct. App. 1983) (state has compelling interest in determining paternity of child where
determination would cut welfare costs by requiring parental contributions to child's
support).
152 "[Tlhe state also has financial concerns; it wishes to have the paternity actions
in which it is involved proceed as economically as possible. . . ." 452 U.S. at 14.
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use of the URESA two-state proceeding. Only then can we assess
the desirability of additional procedures and their resulting fiscal
and administrative costs.
C. The Risk of an Erroneous Finding of Paternity
Neither URESA nor RURESA offers a complete procedural
mechanism to actually litigate the paternity case. The few hearirig
procedures that are part of both Acts were designed for use in
the "normal" support case, without regard to complex issues
often associated with paternity litigation.'- 3 Because the original
Act and its subsequent amendments adopt the presence of the
obligor as the test to determine the choice of law to be applied,
most cases will require the application of both the procedural
and the substantive law of the responding state. 5 4 While not a
serious problem in the typical support cases,'55 the variations in
paternity litigation can be significant. Burdens of proof may
vary, 15 6 the admissibility and use of blood and other scientific
tests are not uniform, 57 and the need for corroboration of
M Section 20 sets out the procedure to be used when the "obligor denies owing
the duty of support . . . or offers evidence constituting a defense." See RURESA § 20,
9A U.L.A. 700. This section contemplates the use of a deposition as a substitute for an
in-person appearance but offers little help in trying to determine when "the presence of
either or both of the parties is not necessary" in the paternity context. RURESA § 27,
9A U.L.A. 730.
See RURESA § 4, 9A U.L.A. 661.
' See W. BROCKELBANK & F. INFAUSTO, supra note 31, at 36.
"6 See, e.g., Department of Social Serv. ex. rel. Beatrice V.P. v. Trustum C. D.,
468 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), appeal denied sub nom. Department of Social
Serv. ex rel. Passaro v. Devoe, 473 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (N.Y. 1984) (clear and convincing);
State ex rel. Bauersachs v. Williams, 340 N.W.2d 431 (Neb. 1983) (preponderance of
the evidence); Montgomery v. Watts, 380 A.2d 75 (Vt. 1977) (preponderance of the
evidence); State ex rel. Toryak v. Spagnuolo, 292 S.E.2d 654 (W. Va. 1982) (beyond a
reasonable doubt).
1, Many states allow the admissibility of blood test evidence only when offered to
exclude a defendant as the father. As of January 1983, "human leakocyte antigens"
[hereinafter HLA] test results were admissible to determine paternity in 36 jurisdictions.
Kolko, Admissibility of HLA Test Results to Determine Paternity, 9 F~m. L. REP.
(BNA) 4009 (1983). Since that time, HLA test results became admissible by statute in
Indiana and West Virginia. Monograph Update, 9 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 1113. When
blood tests are used as "exclusionary" evidence, some states make a definite exclusion
conclusive. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1 (1981). Others view the results as
conclusive if not challenged, but otherwise inconclusive. See, e.g., Symonds v. Symonds,
432 N.E.2d 700 (Mass. 1982). Other states treat the test results as inconclusive. See,
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testimony is not universally accepted.5 8 The matter is further
complicated by the availability of a jury trial in some jurisdic-
tions, 59 appointed counsel in others,16° and state-financed blood
tests in yet others.'
6'
These fundamental variations in procedural protections and
evidentiary matters militate against sweeping conclusions about
the risk of an erroneous finding of paternity in the interstate
context. The risk facing each interstate defendant is determined
both by the evidentiary burdens and procedural protections man-
dated by state law, and by the interstate nature of the proceed-
ing. 62 Ultimately, the impact of the interstate procedures on the
fundamental fairness of the entire proceeding must be assessed
on a state by state basis.163 However, there are numerous com-
mon problems in the interstate action which can be isolated and
examined.
Before assessing these procedural problems, it is important
to emphasize that distance between the litigants merely com-
pounds an already difficult situation for the defendant. Many
defendants begin the paternity action significantly disadvantaged
e.g., State ex rel. Hausner v. Blackman, 662 P.2d 1183 (Kan. 1983). See generally H.
KRAUSE, supra note 19, at 218.
When offered as "inclusionary" evidence, HLA test results are not considered
conclusive. See, e.g., Crain v. Crain, 662 P.2d 538 (Idaho 1983); Haines v. Shanholtz,
468 A.2d 1365 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984), cert. denied, 475 A.2d 1201 (Md. 1984);
Turek v. Hardy, 458 A.2d 562 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). For a general discussion concerning
the weight to be given evidence which establishes a "probability" of paternity, see H.
KRAUSE, supra note 19, at 219. Cf. note 262 infra.
"I See, e.g., Colgan v. Hammond, 472 A.2d 497 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
(mother's testimony alone sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss). But see Wade v.
Hicks, 218 N.W.2d 222 (Neb. 1974) (uncorroborated testimony of mother not sufficient
to establish paternity); OR. Rav. STAT. § 109.145 (1981) (requires corroborating evidence
of paternity in addition to the mother's testimony).
"I See, e.g., Proctor v. Sachner, 118 A.2d 621 (Conn. 1955); Ehorn v. Podraza,
367 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Wahlers v. Frye, 288 N.W.2d 29 (Neb. 1980);
Clarkston v. Bridge, 539 P.2d 1094 (Or. 1975).
'6 See, e.g., County of Tulare v. Ybarra, 192 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Ct. App. 1983); State
ex rel. Cody v. Toner, 456 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1912 (1984).
See generally Note, supra note 122, at 497.
161 See, e.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1; Kennedy v. Wood, 439 N.E.2d 1367
(Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Anderson v. Jacobs, 428 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio 1981).
162 See notes 127-28 supra.
163 See id.
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because of their inability to disprove paternity, 1' and we must
acknowledge these proof problems in order to fully assess the
impact of the additional interstate procedural hurdles on the
defendant's due process rights.
1. The Difficulty of Proof
The paternity action differs from other civil matters in that
it consistently presents problems for litigants rarely found in
other areas of the law. For example, mothers must often con-
front the putative father's assertion of cohabitation with other
men at the critical time-"a traditional and (due to frequent
perjury) potentially vicious defense.' 165 Once asserted, this de-
fense may force a mother to have to prove a negative-that she
did not have sexual relations with other men-or forego the
action. If she chooses to continue, the actual trial of the case
can become what has been called a "sordid spectacle" focusing
on the mother's alleged sexual promiscuity.
66
On the other hand, in many cases the putative father has the
nearly impossible task of disproving paternity in the face of the
mother's allegation of sexual relations. On the basis of the
mother's uncorroborated testimony, 6 7 some states shift the bur-
den of proof to the defendant who must then affirmatively
disprove paternity. 168 Other states not only shift the burden of
proof to the defendant but also require corroboration of his
testimony to overcome the mother's prima facie case. 169 It has
I" See 452 U.S. at 12. See also Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (recog-
nizing "the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity"). Schatkin notes in
discussing the defendant's burden in defending a paternity action that "in reality the
burden goes beyond mere disproof of the charge; respondent must actually demonstrate
non-paternity." Schatkin, The Problem of Defense of a Paternity Proceeding, 21 DE
PAUL L. REv. 85, 88 (1971).
" H. KRAUSE, supra note 19, at 198.
16 See H. KRAUSE, supra note 130, at 107. Note that the difficulty for the mother
at trial will depend primarily on the nature of the defense asserted by the putative father.
See text accompanying notes 295-307 infra.
"I A number of states do not require corroboration of the mother's testimony. See
cases cited supra note 158.
"I See H. KRAUSE, supra note 19, at 196; S. ScATv, N, DISPUTED PATErTY
PROCEEDI NS 74-76 (4th ed. 1967).
10 See, e.g., Mosher v. Bennett, 144 A. 297 (Conn. 1929), in which the Connecticut
Supreme Court held: "The prima facie case so made out places upon the reputed father
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been suggested that, in this emotionally pressured milieu, lies
and perjury abound.
170
The issues involved in the paternity action suggest the diffi-
culty facing the fact finder searching for the "truth." It is little
wonder that courts adjudicating questions of filiation stand ac-
cused of having abdicated their ultimate responsibility to fully
and fairly decide the factual issues raised. According to one
commentator, "many courts no longer try to find a fair reso-
lution of each case-conviction rates reaching 950 are not un-
common in paternity actions.'
171
While it has been suggested that defendants admit paternity
in 50% to 75% of all cases, 72 these estimates do not show how
many of these "admissions" come from men who merely give
up because of a sense of despair in meeting their burden of
the burden of showing his innocence of the charge, and under our practice he must do
this by other evidence than his own." Id. at 298. For discussions of other evidentiary
problems inherent in the paternity action, see H. KRAUSE, supra note 19, at 196; S.
ScHArKN, supra note 168, at 74-76.
170 A six year lie detector study by Arthur & Reid shows that 93% of the tested
parties lied in some respect concerning their sexual relationships. See Arthur & Reid,
Utilizing Lie Detector Techniques to Determine the Truth in Disputed Paternity Cases,
45 J. CneI. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 213, 215 (1954) (cited in H. KRAusE, supra
note 130, at 107 n.8).
"I H. KRAUSE, supra note 130, at 107 (citing Glazer, Blood Grouping Tests in the
Proof of Non-Paternity, 33 MIcH. ST. B.J. No. 1, 12, 17 (1954); Sussman, Blood
Grouping Tests-A Review of 1000 Cases of Disputed Paternity, 40 A.J. CLNICAL
PATHOLOGY 38 (1963)). More recently Krause wrote:
In many areas conditions still resemble those described in a 1968 report of
the Family Study Commission of the State of Illinois:
The investigation and information obtained by the Commission on
paternity law and practice leads to the inescapable conclusion that
coercion, corruption, perjury and indifference to the rights of the
individual defendant pervade in the day to day practice in this area of
judicial proceedings.... Testimony before the Commission revealed
that generally defendants appear before judges who have a daily case
load of about 140 cases .... Testimony from the sitting judiciary
hearing paternity cases revealed to the Commission that the evidence in
most cases consists of an accusation by the woman and a denial by the
defendant. Under such circumstances, the judges feel constrained to
enter a finding of paternity. Not even the slightest corroborating evi-
dence is required.
H. KRAUSE, supra note 19, at 163 (footnote omitted) (quoting FAMILY STUDY COMMISSION,
STATE OF ILLINoIs, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO TM 76TH GENERAL ASSEmBLY, at
55 (1969)).
"2 See H. KRAUSE, supra note 19, at 166.
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proof. When defendants do contest the issues at trial, they are
adjudicated to be the father in 75% to 90% of the cases.
173
Thus, between 87% and 97% of all defendants are ultimately
determined to be the father and ordered to pay support.
74
While this high percentage of paternity determinations sug-
gests that defendants are actually the father in most cases in
which they are accused, other studies seem to contradict this
view. In blood test studies of 1,000 cases of disputed paternity,
39.6% of the men accused could not have been the father of
the child in question.175 In another study, blood tests revealed
that 18% of a group of men who had already admitted paternity
could not have been the biological father of the child.
76
Although there have been repeated calls for reform, 77 doubt
remains concerning the extent to which these problems have
been successfully remedied. 78 Reform notwithstanding, the in-
terstate nature of the URESA action only exacerbates difficult
proof problems for defendants forced to defend the interstate
paternity action when the moving party, the child and the med-
ical records are located in another state.
2. The Effect of Distance
Distance between litigants, in and of itself, is benign. The
importance of distance in any litigation depends primarily on its
effect on the discovery, acquisition and effective presentation of
the factual evidence supporting the various claims and defenses.
While the impediments to successful long distance case presen-
tation can be severe, most if not all are ultimately economic.
For the party with money, distance is usually not a problem and
17 Id.
174 Id.
M" Sussman, supra note 171, at 38, 41 (cited in H. KRAUSE, supra note 130, at
107).
276 Sussman & Schatkin, Blood Grouping Tests in Undisputed Paternity Proceed-
ings, 164 J.A.M.A. 249, 250 (1957) (cited in H. KRAUSE, supra note 130, at 108).
I" The call for reform centers primarily around the increased use of blood and
scientific evidence. See, e.g., H. KRAusE, supra note 19, at 213; S. ScATKIN, supra
note 168, at § 8.11. See also text beginning at note 259 infra. Many of the long sought
reforms are present in the Uniform Parentage Act described in Note, supra note 129, at
489.
",' See note 171 supra. See also note 262 infra.
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can be a distinct advantage against an opponent without ade-
quate funds to finance long-distance discovery and trial. 79 The
converse is equally true. In assessing the procedural fairness of
the URESA paternity proceeding, any increased risk of an er-
roneous determination of paternity which results from the two-
state lawsuit must be considered, as well as the availability of
procedural devices likely to ameliorate the detrimental effects of
distance between the litigants.
a. Pre-Trial Discovery
The importance of pre-trial discovery in paternity litigation
cannot be overstated. 80 Proper adjudication depends upon a
clear and correct presentation of the legal issues in the case,
which in turn requires that both parties acquire and present the
relevant facts ultimately dispositive of those issues. Whenever
either party is frustrated in an attempt to acquire relevant in-
formation, the potential for an erroneous finding is increased.'1'
In the paternity context, most often this necessary evidence
centers on the facts leading up to the child's conception and
birth. s2 The location of this evidence is rarely a factor in the
"I "Today though discovery seems indispensible to the governing of all relevant
data for trial. As discovery becomes more expensive there is a de facto discrimination
suffered by low income litigants unable to afford the uncovering of all essential facts."
Schmertz, Written Depositions Under Federal and State Rules as Cost-Effective Discov-
ery at Home and Abroad, 16 VILL. L. REv. 7, 56 (1970).
"I "[A] lawyer gathering and selecting evidence greatly affects the outcome of most
disputes." D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION, FROM HyponTaSLs To PROOF
5 (West 1984). For an excellent look at the importance of pre-trial fact development in
civil litigation, see generally G. BELLOW & B. MourLTIN, TtE LAWYERING PRocEss, 273-
429 (1978). See also W. GLASER, PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYsTEm 53
(1968).
'" How do notice and hearing serve as tools for "arriving at truth"? The
most obvious purpose of a hearing is to permit the gathering of evidence
to aid in the resolution of some issue or controversy. A hearing promotes
accurate discovery of facts by giving a party the opportunity to present
evidence.... The implementation of law demands that the underlying
facts of the situation be accurately ascertained, because otherwise the social
policy which a particular law represents will be frustrated.
Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be Heard: The Significance of Old Friends,
9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 449, 452-53 (1974). See generally Rubenstein, Procedural
Due Process and the Limits of the Adversary System, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Ray. 48
(1976).
'82 Of particular relevance are the records of birth and other items of medical
evidence which are significant in fixing the period of gestation. A defendant who cannot
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"normal" intrastate paternity action, since both parties usually
reside in close proximity to each other and to the crucial evi-
dence. However, discovery is more difficult in the URESA con-
text, b'cause the parties reside in different states.
Much of the necessary evidence relevant to the question of
filiation is likely to be found in the state in which conception
and birth took place"3 [hereinafter the birthing jurisdiction].
Yet, at least one and possibly both of the parties will no longer
reside in that state. This can pose a significant problem for the
defendant who must discover and acquire evidence from a for-
eign birthing jurisdiction for presentation at trial in his home
state. The paternity defendant is obviously free to go to the
birthing jurisdiction to investigate and acquire evidence through
informal means. 184 However, even when informal discovery is
affordable and successful, the acquisition of certain information
requires use of discovery devices. 85
In the URESA action, the scope and availability of formal
discovery will be governed by the law of the responding state
since the Act itself neither addresses nor provides procedures for
formal pre-trial discovery. 8 6 In theory, only those defendants
who reside in states which restrict the scope or availability of
formal discovery in the paternity action will face difficulty in
formulating an effective defense. 87 In practice, however, most
URESA defendants are unable to take full advantage of the
discovery available to them because of the expense involved. For
accurately fix the period of gestation loses the potentially valuable defense that focuses
on the timing of intercourse and conception. These records are frequently fertile sources
of other exculpatory evidence such as the plaintiff's social history and admissions against
interest. Doctors, nurses, friends and relatives of the mother and father are also sources
of potentially valuable evidence, particularly the history of the parties' relationship and
relevant statements or admissions. See text accompanying notes 288-94 infra.
"I See note 182 supra. See also note 308 infra.
114 On the importance of informal discovery and fact investigation see R. KEETON,
TUA. TACTICS AND METHODs 303-11 (2d ed. 1973). See generally G. BELLOW & B.
MOULTON, note 180 supra.
"I For example, absent agreement, the discovery of the mother's and child's medical
records requires the use of either a request for production of documents or a records
deposition.
" RURESA § 4, 9A U.L.A. 661. See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
z In states in which the paternity action is regarded as "civil," the defendant will
often have the benefit of the same discovery devices available to URESA defendants
generally. See, e.g., Thelen v. Thelen, 281 S.E.2d 737 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981); Maza v.
Iaia, 430 N.Y.S.2d 244 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1980).
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example, only the comparatively wealthy can afford the costs of
conducting out-of-state discovery depositions' 8 -an essential tool
in certain situations.
1 89
However, even the most indigent defendant is not without
affordable discovery devices. 190 As an alternative to the discovery
deposition, most defendants can afford more economical discov-
ery which, if used properly, can help minimize the difficulty in
the interstate accumulation of evidence. Interrogatories and re-
quests for production of documents offer inexpensive1 91 and
effective methods of acquiring certain types of evidence. De-
fendants can also make broader use of requests for admissions
to narrow and define disputed factual and legal issues. 92
Because of the involvement of two states in the URESA
proceeding, the URESA defendant may actually have a slight
advantage over the "normal" state court civil litigant attempting
interstate discovery. Commonly, limitations on state subpoena
power stall or halt interstate discovery altogether. 193 As courts
of limited jurisdiction, state tribunals have neither nationwide
service of process 94 nor nationwide enforcement of discovery
orders.1 95 Thus, while state courts can monitor and enforce dis-
covery involving in-state litigants, 196 they have no such power
-' These costs can be significant. In addition to the cost of the deposition transcript,
attorney's fees and travel cost must be considered. See Comment, The Uniform Recip-
rocal Enforcement of Support Act: Procedural Problems and a Technological Solution,
41 TEMP. L.Q. 325, 330-31 nn.27-29 (1967-68) (author discusses prevailing fees and costs
for depositions).
"I For a discussion of the value of pre-trial interrogation of the opposing party in
paternity cases, see S. Sc-rATKN, supra note 168, at § 20.03.
11 This statement assumes the availability of counsel or the sophistication to use
formal discovery devices without the aid of counsel.
19, "Inexpensive" is used relatively. The expense of these written forms of discovery
should be compared with that of oral deposition. Cf. note 188 supra. Since attorney
time is still necessary, the actual cost will depend on the attorney's fee schedule.
-g G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 180, at 418-26.
'9 State courts generally have no mechanism to conduct discovery beyond their
borders. See generally Mullin, Interstate Deposition Statutes, 11 U. BALT. L. REv. 1
(1981); Rafalko, Depositions, Commissions, and Letters Regatory in a Conflict of Law
Case, 4 DUQ. L. Rv. 115 (1965-66) (discusses in depth the problems associated with
interstate discovery). However, in federal court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide for nationwide discovery. See FED. R. Crv. P. 45(d).
114 See Mullin, supra note 193, at 2.
195 See id.
196 Most states have provisions patterned after FED. R. Civ. P. 37 for sanctions
against parties who fail to comply with the discovery rules. See Developments in the
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over persons outside of the court's jurisdiction. 97 Similar prob-
lems do not exist in a URESA action because the case is docketed
in two states, both of which can monitor and enforce the dis-
covery process and issue subpoenas. When discovery is sought
in the mother's home state, the defendant can benefit from that
state court's subpoena power and availability to oversee the
discovery process.
In the final analysis, pre-trial discovery can be somewhat
problematic for the URESA defendant. However, this difficulty
results primarily from the increased expense in conducting inter-
state discovery and not from the URESA action itself. The
URESA paternity defendant's discovery options are the same as
if the mother had brought the action in his home state.1 98 Since
no court has ever questioned the fairness of a proceeding brought
originally in the defendant's home state merely because of re-
sulting problems in conducting interstate discovery, we should
not be eager to do so in the URESA context. However, the
URESA defendant's discovery difficulties are nonetheless signif-
icant as one of a number of distance-related problems which
can increase the likelihood of an erroneous finding of patern-
ity. 199
b. Affirmative Presentation of Evidence
The most unique and troublesome provision in the Act is
RURESA section 20 which specifically addresses the problem
surrounding the presentation of evidence in cases where the
putative father offers a defense. 200 RURESA procedure antici-
Law-Discovery, 74 HAIv. L. REv. 940, 1050 (1960-61) (cited in Mullin, supra note
193, at 2 n.6). However, the power of the court extends only to those individuals subject
to the court's jurisdiction. Sanctions in the interstate discovery context can be enforced
only by the court with jurisdiction over the person against whom sanctions are sought.
Mullin, supra note 193, at 2 n.6.
,17 See Mullin, supra note 193, at 2 n.6. However, note that many state courts
retain the discretion to order the attendance of a witness in a deposition to be used in
another state. See, e.g., Ai.AsKA R. Civ. P. 27(c) (1963); IDAHo R. CIv. P. 28(e) (1979);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1983); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. R. § 3102(e) (McKinney 1970).
See also Mullin, supra note 193, at 30. Even in these states application must be made
to the state court of the deponent's residence. Id.
1'9 See note 187 supra.
I' See text accompanying note 351 infra.
See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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pates that most if not all of a mother's evidence will be adduced
in her home state and subsequently transmitted to and presented
in the responding state for consideration by the trial court.20' By
sanctioning such a mechanism, the drafters sought to resolve the
Act's essential dilemma-how to conduct an adversarial adju-
dicatory proceeding long-distance w;+hout requiring the mother
to leave her home state.20 2
By creating the two-state deposition procedure, the Act at-
tempts to resolve this dilemma. However, the procedure raises a
number of practical and theoretical problems for both sides.
How can a mother who testifies in her home state effectively
persuade an absent trier of fact? There is no doubt that testi-
mony from a live witness has more impact than testimony pre-
sented by a "paper" witness deposed prior to trial. 230  Yet the
Act anticipates that most of the mother's evidence will be pre-
sented in exactly this way. 2°4 Although this may not be the
procedure of choice for most plaintiffs, the actual harm to the
mother may be relatively insignificant. Little evidence is required
to make out the mother's prima facie case of filiation and shift
the burden of production to the defendant. 205 Once the burden
is shifted, the mother actually benefits from the two-state mech-
anism because she may be insulated from potentially harmful
cross-examination. 206
Though rarely addressed,20 7 the defendant may confront a
number of obstacles in affirmatively presenting evidence located
outside of his home state. 28 This dilemma, like that faced in
201 See id.
2 Id.
203 The importance of this factor will be determined by the extent to which there
are factual disputes between the parties. Where the defense raised is not one which
implicates the credibility of the mother, see note 301 infra, the "paper" presentation of
evidence is without consequence to the mother.
21 See notes 38, 201 supra and accompanying text.
2 See notes 158, 167 supra and accompanying text.
r' Without cross-examination of the mother, her prima facie case remains intact
and unchallenged, forcing a defendant to rely exclusively upon the affirmative presen-
tation of evidence which itself may be problematic. See note 308 infra and accompanying
text.
In discussing the procedural problems created by URESA, the focus is usually
on the defendant's inability to cross-examine the plaintiff rather than on his affirmative
presentation of evidence. See notes 225, 227 infra and accompanying text.
1 As to the likelihood that a defendant will require evidence located outside of
his home state, see note 308 infra and accompanying text.
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conducting interstate discovery, is primarily economic. The de-
fendant will have to forego the use of certain evidence and
testimony unless he can arrange to have the evidence available
for use in his home state. In most cases he will have to either
transport the witness to his state or preserve the testimony by
deposition in the witness's state for subsequent use in the re-
sponding state.209 Neither alternative is economically realistic for
most defendants.
When the out-of-state evidence is located in the mother's
home state, a possible solution for the defendant lies in his use
of the RURESA two-state deposition procedure. Although de-
vised to allow the mother to present her testimony without
leaving her home state,210 this procedure is also available to the
defendant in RURESA paternity actions. 21' However, the pro-
cedure is beneficial only if the defendant's witness resides in the
same state as the mother. In this event, the defendant can depose
his witness in the initiating state and present the deposition at
trial in the responding state.
Despite the availability of the two-state deposition, practical
difficulties abound. The defendant and his representative are
located in the responding state and will find it difficult to take
the deposition of a witness located in the initiating state without
traveling to that state or obtaining counsel there to conduct the
deposition. The defendant's only alternative is to conduct the
deposition of his witness in a manner similar to that used to
conduct depositions upon written questions.212 The defendant
can draft and forward to the presiding judge in the initiating
state a series of questions which the judge then addresses to the
witness for answer under oath. 213 Although this procedure offers
a workable solution which preserves the out-of-state testimony
for use at trial, defendants can legitimately complain that the
2- Absent stipulation to the contrary, the only alternative to in-court testimony is
presentation by deposition pursuant to a local rule of court analogous to FED. R. Crv.
P. 32 (regulating use of depositions in court proceedings).
210 See text accompanying note 202 supra.
21 The language of RURESA § 20, 9A U.L.A. 700 (1968), allows evidence relative
to the duty of support to be adduced by "either party" through deposition.
212 Depositions upon written questions are sanctioned by FED. R. Civ. P. 31 and
are a commonly allowed form of pre-trial discovery. See Schmertz, supra note 179
(discusses problems associated with depositions upon written questions).
211 See FED. R. Civ. P. 31.
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quality of the evidence is severely diminished. Spontaneity van-
ishes in the written format, and the overall effectiveness of the
testimony is lessened because the final product-the written tran-
script-is without life. 2
14
Videotaping offers a solution to the lifelessness of the written
transcript.215 Videotaped depositions have nearly all of the qual-
ities of live in-court testimony and are widely available. 2 6 The
videotape deposition, however, is more expensive than a tradi-
tional stenographic deposition.217 Moreover, full benefit of the
videotape may be achieved only if defendant's counsel either
travels to the initiating state to conduct the deposition, or retains
counsel in that state to do so.
Neither alternative offers the defendant a method of pre-
senting the testimony of out-of-state witnesses that is both eco-
nomical and effective in all cases. Unless the defendant can
afford to hire counsel in the initiating jurisdiction, or finance
the cost of travel, he must either limit himself to using written
questions in the context of the two-state deposition procedure
or do without the out-of-state testimony. Either option increases
the likelihood of an erroneous finding of paternity.
c. Cross-Examination
While affirmative presentation of out-of-state evidence is
difficult for the defendant, cross-examination of the mother and
her out-of-state witnesses is even more difficult. As suggested
114 The actual harm to the defendant resulting from use of this device will be
determined by the nature of the issues in the case. See notes 299-302, 352 infra and
accompanying text.
215 See generally Comment, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act:
Procedural Problems and a Technological Solution, 41 TEho. L.Q. 325 (1967-68), which
argues that an increased use of technological advances by litigants will solve some of
the problems inherent in the two-state lawsuit. In addition, the Comment also discusses
audiotape depositions, telephone depositions, and the picture-phone. See id. at 333-35.
while technological advances may provide the long-term solution to the URESA di-
lemma, the cost of the more useful devices, videotape and interactive picture-phone, is
presently beyond the reach of most litigants.
216 See generally Balabanian, Medium v. Tedium: Video Depositions Come of Age,
7 LrTGATiON 25 (1980); Murray, Videotaped Depositions: Putting Absent Witnesses in
Court, 68 A.B.A. J. 1402 (1982); Rypinski, Videotaping Depositions, 17 HAwAIn B.J.
67 (1982).
217 See Balabanian, supra note 216, at 27.
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above, the two-state deposition procedure may work to the
mother's advantage because of the limitations placed on the
defendant's ability to cross-examine.21 8 Inability to cross-examine
witnesses "in absentia" may severely disadvantage some defend-
ants and result in the same "go there or do nothing" dilemma
originally confronting mothers before the passage of URESA.2
19
This may be the most serious defect in the Act. 220 When a mother
testifies in her home state, the defendant must give up his right
to cross-examine unless he can afford to travel to her home state
or obtain counsel there-alternatives usually not within the eco-
nomic means of most defendants? 21 This fundamental defect in
the two-state procedure has led a number of litigants to raise
constitutional challenges focusing on the denial of the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses at trial. 2m
In Smith v. Smith,2 the Supreme Court of California upheld
the constitutionality of the two-state hearing procedure despite
the respondent's assertion that his due process rights were vio-
lated because he was denied the right to confront and cross-
examine the obligee-mother whose testimony was elicited pur-
21 See note 206 supra and accompanying text.
219 However, the defendant's cross-examination problem does not exist when he has
the economic resources to travel or hire counsel in the initiating state.
" The importance of adversarial cross-examination as a tool to develop an accurate
and complete factual predicate for judicial adjudication has been emphasized. See, e.g.,
L. STRYKER, TBE ART OF ADVOCACY 65-84 (1954). Styker notes Wigmore's view of
cross-examination to be "beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth." Id. at 73.
222 While there is no empirical evidence to support this conclusion, the enormous
cost of conducting litigation in another state suggests that it is beyond the economic
reach of most persons.
= See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 270 P.2d 613, 622 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Duncan
v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Ky. 1953). A variety of other constitutional challenges
have been asserted by litigants, usually to no avail. See, e.g., Harmon v. Harmon, 324
P.2d 901 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 881 (1958) (no violation of
privileges and immunities clause); Smith v. Smith, 281 P.2d 274 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1955) (URESA creates no criminal offense and therefore is not violative of constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws); Proctor v. Sachner, 118 A.2d 621 (Conn. 1955)
(URESA not unconstitutional as an attempt to confer extraterritorial jurisdiction on
court of initiating state); State ex rel. Terry v. Terry, 453 P.2d 206 (N.M. 1969) (no
denial of due process or equal protection). The issue of the Act's constitutionality has
also led to significant commentary. See, e.g., Brockelbank, Is the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act Constitutional?, 17 Mo. L. Rsv. 1 (1952).
270 P.2d at 613.
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suant to the URESA two-state deposition in the initiating state. 224
Focusing on the civil nature of the proceeding, the court disposed
of the cross-examination issue by noting that the California Code
of Civil Procedure specifically authorizes the use, at trial, of
depositions to present the testimony of out-of-state witnesses.2
The court concluded that the use of URESA's two-state depo-
sition procedure did not deprive the defendant of due process
because he was "given notice, an opportunity to be heard, by
deposition to examine and cross-examine the plaintiff and any
witness that may have testified in the initiating state, to examine
and cross-examine any witnesses that may testify in this state
[California], to meet opposing evidence, and to oppose with
evidence."
226
Other cases have also addressed this cross-examination issue
and all have uniformly reached the same conclusion using similar
reasoning. 227 Significantly, all of the cases which specifically
uphold the constitutionality of the two-state procedure do so in
the context of a support action where paternity is not in issue.2
This is an extremely important distinction because of the fun-
damental difference in the nature of the rights at stake in the
two actions229 and the proof problems inherent in paternity ac-
tions.2 10 The fundamental interests at stake in the paternity case
caution against adopting the holdings of these cases without a
more rigorous examination of the problem.
"' The court found that "[a] defendant in a civil action or special proceeding is
not guaranteed a right of confrontation at the trial of the action or proceeding." Id. at
622 (citation omitted). Accord Robinson v. Robinson, 221 N.E.2d at 599-600; Freeman
v. Freeman, 76 So. 2d at 415; Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 103 A.2d at 435.
"I See 270 P.2d at 622.
46 Id. at 623.
22 "The fact that the petitioner is not required to be physically present in the
responding state is no obstacle, because in any ordinary action a petition may be filed
in a court of this state without the plaintiff being physically present, and in cases tried
on depositions it is possible for a case to be tried in a court of this state without the
plaintiff being present in the state," Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d at 377 (cited in
Smith v. Smith, 270 P.2d at 623). Due process is met when the defendant had "reason-
able notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and present his claim or defense."
Proctor v. Sachner, 118 A.2d at 625,
See note 227 supra.
29 See text accompanying note 143 supra.
23 See text accompanying note 165 supra.
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Those who want to endorse the use of the two-state hearing
procedure in the paternity context will do so primarily by ref-
erence to the cases cited above and to state rules of civil pro-
cedure which sanction the use at trial of deposition testimony
of out-of-state witnesses. 23 By analogy, proponents can argue
that since the testimony of out-of-state witnesses can be pre-
sented by deposition in other civil matters, the two-state depo-
sition should be similarly admissible in the URESA proceeding.
There will be no denial of due process because of inability to
cross-examine adverse witnesses at trial as long as the putative
father has notice and an opportunity to appear and conduct
cross-examination in the initiating state. Thus, the defendant in
the URESA paternity action stands in a position similar to that
of other civil litigants facing opponents who seek to present
testimony of out-of-state witnesses by deposition. Although this
argument by analogy has surface logic, a close examination of
deposition practice suggests a number of important distinctions
not considered by courts that have addressed the question.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and modern state rules
based thereon, clearly provide that depositions of witnesses
232
and adverse parties233 are admissible as substantive evidence at
trial .2 4 However, a party's use of his own deposition as sub-
stantive evidence at trial has been somewhat more controver-
sial . 5 Early cases cast some doubt on the use of this procedure, 
2 6
but subsequent decisions have uniformly embraced it, and the
practice in both federal and state courts routinely allows either
party his or her own testimony by deposition. 237
2S, See, e.g., Omo R. Civ. P. 32 patterned after FED. R. CIV. P. 32.
23 FED. R. Cv. P. 32(a)(3) governs the use of witness deposition testimony as
substantive evidence at trial.
"I The use of the deposition of a party by an adverse party is governed by FED.
R. Crv. P. 32(a)(2).
See 4A J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 32.02-.04 (1984); C. WRIGrr
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2144-46 (1970).
"' The controversy surrounds FED. R. Civ. P. 32(d)(3) which allows use of the
deposition when the witness (party) is more than 100 miles from the place of the trial,
See generally 4A J. MOORE, supra note 234, at § 32.05; 8 C. WRiGrHT & A. MMLER,
supra note 234, at § 2147.
"I See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
231 See, e.g., GFI Computer Industries v. Fry, 476 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1973); Richmond
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However, this general rule of admissibility is not without
limitations. Use of depositions at trial in lieu of testimony is
allowed only where the witness, whether a party or not, is unable
to attend the trial or is beyond subpoena power of the court.3
Further, the party against whom a deposition is being used must
have been present or represented at the deposition or had rea-
sonable notice thereof and failed to attend.239 This requirement
insures an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the de-
ponent in person before the deposition is admitted as evidence
at trial.
These general principles support the use of the URESA two-
state deposition as long as the defendant receives adequate notice
of the deposition and the other requirements of the state's rules
of procedure are met. But most URESA defendants are without
adequate resources to finance the cost of attending the out-of-
state deposition, 4 and a legitimate question is raised regarding
the significance of this economic issue. An examination of sim-
ilar economic issues in the context of civil deposition practice is
helpful in answering this important question.
In federal civil depositions it is generally up to the party
taking the deposition to set the time and place of the deposi-
tion. 241 The final designation of location, however, is solely
within the discretion of the trial court, which is empowered to
grant protective relief to an aggrieved party in order to further
the interests of justice.242 As part of its discretion, the court can
v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1955). Contra Bartell v. Bartell, 357 A.2d 343 (Md.
1976); King v. International Harvester Co., 181 S.E.2d 656 (Va. 1971).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3). This provision of the rule reflects the "long
established principle that testimony by deposition is less desirable than oral testimony
and should be used as a substitute only if the witness is not available to testify in
person." 8 C. WRiGT & A. MMLER, supra note 234, at § 2142 (footnotes omitted).
29 See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a). Additionally, depositions cannot be offered against
persons not a party to the action at the time of the deposition. See Hoover v. Switlik
Parachute Co., 663 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1981). Neither can they be offered when notice
is not adequate. See Bobb v. Modern Products, Inc., 648 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1981). See
also FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(2).
m See note 221 supra.
2,' See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2), 26(c). See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 234, at § 2112.
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2) allows for the issuance of a protective order requiring
that discovery be had only on specified terms or conditions "including a designation of
the time or place."
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establish the location of depositions or change locations when it
deems justice so requires.2 43 This aspect of the court's discre-
tionary power is often exercised when an out-of-state plaintiff
institutes suit in the home state of the defendant.244 In this case,
the out-of-state plaintiff will generally be required to make her-
self available for examination in the district in which the action
is brought.245
As an alternative to fixing the place of deposition, a court
also retains similar discretionary power to require a party who
proposes to take an oral deposition at a distance from the forum
to prepay the expenses which his opponent will incur in having
an attorney attend the deposition.24 Thus, by either fixing the
location of the deposition or by shifting the cost of attending
the deposition to the out-of-state deponent, a court can and will
insure a proper allocation of the economic burden in light of
the circumstances of the case and the particularized need for
discovery. 247 The out-of-state plaintiff who wishes to preserve
her testimony by deposition for use at trial may do so, but may
have to be deposed in the forum state or prepay the defendant's
expense in attending the out-of-state deposition.
The question of allocation of costs is an obvious concern in
the context of the URESA deposition procedure. The purpose
of the deposition in this phase of the URESA scheme is not
discovery, but rather the preservation of testimony for trial.
248
For the defendant who cannot attend the out-of-state deposition,
2,1 See, e.g., Grey v. Continental Mktg. Assocs., 315 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
2" See note 245 infra.
1' "Since he has selected the forum, he will not be heard to complain about having
to appear there for a deposition." 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MnILR, supra note 234, at 405.
As Professor Wright points out, the rule is a general one, id. at 405 n.85, and is subject
to exception.
State courts have also adopted the general rule requiring the party deponent to
travel to the forum state. See Welter v. Welter, 267 N.E.2d 442 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1971);
Case Note, Civil Procedure-Which Party Must Travel-Costs-Protective Orders and
the Requirement of Good Cause, 33 Omo ST. L.J. 246 (1972).
24 See Schmertz, Oral Depositions: The Low Income Litigant and the Federal
Rules, 54 VA. L. REv. 391 (1968) (discusses cases in which protective relief is sought by
litigants who lack financial resources). See also 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
234, at § 2112.
2,, See notes 245-46 supra.
'"6 See note 38 supra.
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his loss is not the discovery of information but rather the loss
of the ability to cross-examine the mother and her witnesses at
trial. In the URESA paternity context, mere notice and oppor-
tunity to cross-examine may not be sufficient given the defend-
ant's economic inability to adequately conduct the cross-
examination in a foreign jurisdiction. 249
Alternatives to direct, live cross-examination may be of some
value here. Though not contemplated by the Act, a defendant
could conduct his cross-examination by written questons in a
manner similar to that used for depositions upon written ques-
tions, with the questions being read by the court and answered
by the mother as part of the initiating state's proceeding. 2 0 This
substitute procedure, however, will usually not approach the
effectiveness of live cross-examination, 251 and the essential pur-
pose of cross-examination-to safeguard the accuracy and com-
pleteness of testimony-may be significantly compromised.
2
1
2
241 The URESA defendant must have the benefit of procedures "reasonably calcu-
lated" to protect his fundamental interests. See Rubenstein, supra note 181, at 93. We
cannot simply ignore the economic realities of adversarial litigation "[flor if it is the
adversary process which gives judicial adjudication its assurance of fairness and accuracy,
that assurance cannot be maintained when some parties lack the resources to be effective
adversaries." Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in the Adjudi-
cation of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CoRNELL L. REv. 772, 776-77 (1974). In Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1970), the Supreme Court invalidated on due process grounds
the imposition of court fees and costs that barred petitioner's access to the courts: "Just
as a generally valid notice procedure may fail to satisfy due process because of the
circumstances of the defendant, so too a cost requirement, valid on its face, may offend
due process because it operates to foreclose a particular party's opportunity to be heard."
Id. at 380. However, the Court has refused to extend Boddie where other relief is
available. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
434 (1973).
2 This is a slight variation from the normal procedure used for deposition upon
written questions. See Schmertz, supra note 179, at 10-12 (describes generally the written
deposition practice under the federal rules). Because of the URESA two-state proceeding,
the initiating court, rather than a court stenographer would read the questions. In lieu
of this procedure, written interrogatories could also be used. See Schlecker v. Schiecker,
435 N.Y.S.2d 539 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1981) (in a reciprocal support action the court found
that due process requires that defendant have the right to cross-examine the out-of-state
mother and her witnesses by interrogatory).
21 See Schmertz, supra note 179, at 35-49 (discusses the limitations of the written
deposition devices as well as their usefulness in certain situations).
212 The extent to which accuracy is compromised will ultimately depend upon the
functional importance of the cross-examination in a particular case. See Friendly, "Some
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d. Blood Tests
The use of blood test evidence 2 3 in paternity adjudication is
at an all time high.2 4 The usefulness of this evidence is directly
linked to the principles of Mendel's laws,25 which establish that
an individual's inherited characteristics are determined by pairs
of genes located within the chromosomal structure of his cells.2 6
Each gene of the pair is inherited, one from the mother and the
other from the father.2 7 In simple terms, by testing a child's
blood group (or to those other genetic markers), we can infer
the parental genes giving rise to that blood group (or to those
other genetic markers).2
8
There is now general agreement that the use of blood test
evidence is useful in many cases.2 9 Test results have been used
Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1283 (1974-75). See also notes 301-02 infra
and accompanying text.
11 The blood tests normally used in the paternity context fall into four categories-
red cell antigens, red cell enzymes, serum proteins and Human Leukocyte Antigens
(HLA). For an explanation of the differences among these tests see Krause, Sell, Abbott,
Jennings, Miale & Rettberg, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic
Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAm. L.Q. 247, 263-88 (1976-77) [here-
inafter cited as Krause, Sell]; Peterson, A Few Things You Should Know About Paternity
Tests (But Were Afraid to Ask), 22 SANTA CLARA L. Rsv. 667, 672-75 (1982); Stroud,
Bundrant, & Galindo, Paternity Testing: A Current Approach, 16 TRIAL No. 9, at 46
(1980). The red cell antigen and the HLA tests are the most commonly used and when
combined and used as seven "systems" (ABO, Rh, MNS, Kell, Dulby, Kidd and HLA)
they provide a 91% cumulative probability of negating paternity for wrongly accused
black men and 93% for white men. Krause, Sell, supra note 253, at 254, 257-58. This
probability of exclusion can increase with a corresponding increase in the number of
tests run to the point where "the probability of excluding a wrongly accused father
increases to over 99%." Peterson, supra note 253, at 671 (citing Stroud, Bundrant &
Galindo, supra at 70).
21 The rise is attributable to a number of factors including the advances in scientific
technique and the drastic rise in the overall number of paternity cases brought each
year. See H. KRAusE, supra note 19, at 213.
21 For a thorough and understandable explanation of these "laws," see S. ScHAT-
xIN, supra note 168, at §§ 5.03, 6.05 (1975).
2m Id.
27 Id.
25 Id.
M Chief Justice Burger, writing in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), recognized
the importance and probative value of blood grouping test evidence in paternity cases:
"[There] are seldom accurate or reliable eyewitnesses since the sexual
activities usually take place in intimate and private surroundings, and the
self-serving testimony of a party is of questionable reliability." ... As
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extensively to exclude wrongly accused fathers.2 Although newer,
more sophisticated tests are increasingly being used to help es-
tablish paternity,261 there is disagreement concerning the appro-
priate manner of reporting the test results. 262 Nevertheless, the
use of blood and other scientific test evidence is now an essential
aspect of paternity adjudication, 263 which by its nature can sig-
nificantly affect the accuracy of the proceeding.
264
Our inquiry concerns the effect, if any, that the interstate
nature of the URESA lawsuit has on the use of blood tests and
other scientific evidence. Specifically, we will examine three cru-
cial issues in the context of the URESA two-state lawsuit: (1)
the availability of blood and other scientific tests; (2) the relia-
bility of the tests; and (3) the presentation at trial of the test
results.
Justice Brennan wrote while a member of the Appellate Division of the
New Jersey Superior Court:
"[I]n the field of contested paternity ... the truth is so often obscured
because social pressures create a conspiracy of silence or, worse, induce
deliberate falsity.
"The value of blood tests as a wholesome aid in the quest for
truth in the administration of justice in these matters cannot be gainsaid
in this day. Their reliability as an indicator of the truth has been fully
established. The substantial weight of medical and legal authority attests
their accuracy, not to prove paternity, and not always to disprove it,
but 'they can disprove it conclusively in a great many cases provided
they are administered by specially qualified experts'...."
Id. at 8 (citations omitted). See also H. KRAUSE, supra note 130, at 123; H. KRAUSE,
supra note 19, at 213.
21 See note 157 supra.
261 See note 262 infra.
262 The current dispute focuses on the use of HLA test results as affirmative evidence
of paternity. When presented, this evidence seeks to establish the "probability" or
"likelihood" that the defendant is the father of the child in question. See generally
AMEICAN ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, INCLUSION PROBABILITIES IN PARENTAGE T=sT-
ING (1983) [hereinafter cited as INCLUSION PROBABILITIES]; Terasaki, Resolution by HLA
Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. F.m. L. 543 (1977-
78); Note, The Legal Implications of HLA Testing For Paternity, 16 J. FAM. L. 537
(1977-78); Note, Human Leukocyte Antigen Testing: Technology Versus Policy in Cases
of Disputed Parentage, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1587 (1983). Concern centers on the interpre-
tation and ultimate reliability of this form of "probability" evidence which is based on
statistical analysis. See Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities and Proof. Can HLA and Blood
Group Testing Prove Paternity, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1131 (1979); Jaffee, Comment on
the Judicial Use of HLA Paternity Test Results and Other Statistical Evidence: A
Response to Terasaki, 17 J. FAM. L. 457 (1978-79); Peterson, supra note 253.
2 See notes 253-62 supra.
2" See note 259 supra.
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The question of the admissibility and use of blood or other
genetic test results is not specifically addressed in URESA. This
silence reflects a position of neutrality which neither encourages
nor discourages the use of these scientific tests in the paternity
context. Like all substantive issues implicated in the URESA
proceeding, the admissibility of blood tests will generally be
governed by the law of the responding state.265 In this regard,
the URESA defendant stands in the same position as his non-
URESA counterpart; the invocation of the URESA mechanism
by the mother has no effect on the defendant's substantive right
to use this important evidentiary tool. Although variations in
state law are great 2 66 states almost universally allow the admis-
sion of some form of blood test results in paternity adjudica-
tion.2
67
Regardless of both the type of testing to be done268 and the
test's usefulness in helping to resolve the disputed issues, 269 all
available tests require that blood samples from the mother, child
and putative father be obtained and scientifically analyzed. 270
Fortunately, the availability of blood tests is not adversely af-
fected by the lack of proximity between the individuals being
tested. Recent advances allow blood samples taken in one state
to be shipped to a second state for analysis. Careful monitoring
and coordination can eliminate any dangers associated with this
interstate shipment.2 7' Consequently, there is no reason why these
tests cannot be effectively used in the URESA action.
26 See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
11 See note 157 supra.
- Those courts which have addressed the question have given URESA defendants
rights coextensive with those provided non-URESA paternity defendants generally. See
notes 87-88 supra and accompanying text.
I'' See note 253 supra.
20 See note 262 supra.
270 See note 253 supra and accompanying text. See generally Krause, Sell, supra
note 253, at 280.
27 The initial request to the laboratories taking the samples must be clear as to the
name and address of the laboratory to which the sample is to be shipped, and special
care should be taken concerning identification, collection, labeling, and mailing. See
generally Krause, Sell, supra note 253, at 280. This is especially true when HLA testing
is being done because white blood cells are less stable than red blood cells, especially at
extreme temperatures, and because fresh blood cells are needed for testing. Note, Blood
Test Evidence in Disputed Paternity Cases: Unjustified Adherence to the Exclusionary
Rule, 59 WAsH. U.L.Q. 977, 990-91 (1981).
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The reliability 72 of blood grouping tests and the more so-
phisticated Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) test is primarily
dependent upon the quality of the testing laboratories and their
procedures.2 73 Advocates stress the reliability of test results per-
formed under proper laboratory conditions, 274 while critics focus
on a number of factors that can significantly affect test results. 275
We make no attempts to resolve the debate. Our concern focuses
on what effect, if any, the interstate nature of the proceeding
has on the reliability of test results. Significantly, none of the
errors that can adversely affect test results are necessarily exac-
erbated in the URESA context. Safeguards designed to achieve
minimally acceptable risks in an intrastate situation would be
equally effective in the interstate URESA context. 276 Thus, the
risk of error in the test results appears to be no greater in the
URESA context than in the normal intrastate paternity action.
" Scientific reliability is a requisite for the admissibility of this type of evidence.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See generally C. McCoRMICK,
EvIMEN E 657-62 (3d ed. 1984).
Z3 For a thorough discussion of the reliability of blood typing evidence see H.
KRAusE, supra note 19,at 243. A general discussion of the reliability of HLA tests can
be found in Note, Use of Human Leukocyte Antigen Test Results to Establish Paternity,
14 IND. L. Rav. 831, 836-38 (1981). See also INCLUSION PROBaMrrais, supra note 262,
at 229; Krause, Sell, supra note 253, at 280.
z1 HLA typing is "highly reliable when performed under carefully controlled
conditions by laboratories that perform quality control checks." Terasaki, supra note
262, at 548. "[S]uch evidence is not only clear and convincing, but is conclusive of the
question." Anonymous v. Anonymous, 460 P.2d 32, 35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (citations
omitted) (cited in H. KRAUSE, supra note 19, at 244).
"I [With blood tests,] as with any other item that may be taken or sent to
a laboratory for examination, there is always a possibility of error. Such
matters as (1) although not a great possibility, the containers could have
been mislabeled; (2) the failure to see the agglutenation, particularly if it
is weak; (3) proper control of temperatures; (4) use of too concentrated or
diluted an antiserum, or red cell suspension solution; (5) allowing too much
or too little time for the reaction to occur; (6) too much or too little
centrifugal force which is required in some tests; (7) the deterioration or
contamination of anti-serums [sic]; (8) deterioration of blood tested, es-
pecially if it has been stored too long or exposed to extreme hot or cold;
(9) chemical solutions in which the agglutenation takes place being improper
for the specific anti-serum [sic]; and (10) biological errors, using in [sic]
rare groupings of blood and lack of information on these types.
Jackson v. Jackson, 430 P.2d 289, 292 n.1 (Cal. 1967) (Burke, J., dissenting) (cited in
H. KRAUSE, supra note 19, at 245).
276 See generally Krause, Sell, supra note 253, at 280.
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The admissibility at trial and the evidentiary weight given to
scientific test results is governed by substantive evidence law of
the responding state. 77 However, state law is of little help in
answering the peculiar problems faced by URESA litigants who
wish to use this type of scientific evidence. Absent stipulation,
expert testimony is required to admit the test results as evidence
at trial278 and the availability of that evidence depends upon the
proximity of the expert to the forum state, which in turn is
dependent upon the location of the facility that does the test-
ing.279 But proximity to which state, since the testimony can be
presented in either of two forums?
Since the Act does not answer this question, the choice would
seem to be that of the litigants and determined by which of the
parties plan to use the evidence in their case. The plaintiff and
defendant seem free to present expert testimony in their respec-
tive home states. However, the choice is too significant to the
defendant to be left in the hands of the plaintiff.
If expert testimony is presented by the mother in her home
state, the putative father's opportunity to effectively cross-ex-
amine the expert is severely limited.2 ° However, the converse is
not true. Because the mother has counsel in the home state of
the father to protect her interest,281 she does not face a cross-
- See RURESA § 4, 9A U.L.A. 661.
z1 Admission of this type of evidence requires the presence of the testing expert to
overcome objections based on hearsay and to properly authenticate the test results. See
H. KRAUSE, supra note 19, at 259, for a general discussion concerning evidentiary issues
surrounding the use of blood test evidence. A recent study conducted by the U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Services suggests a high incidence of admission at trial without the
need for testimony: "[Survey results] impI[y] either the existence of informal agreement
between medical and legal professionals or assumptions on the part of the legal or
judicial professional that results could be certified if necessary. A third possible expla-
nation is that many paternity tests are done in a setting that does not require certification
of the results by the laboratory." CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH INC., OFFICE OF CFILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, BLOOD TEsTiNO TO EsTABLISH PATERNITY 17 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as BLOOD TEsTIN].
Charges for expert testimony can range up to $1,200 per day. BLOOD TESTING,
supra note 278, at 17. Since travel time and expenses are normally included in per diem
charges, the expert's distance from the forum will directly affect the availability of the
testimony by increasing costs.
m See text beginning at note 219 supra. Cross-examination by the defendant is
crucial, especially when the mother offers HLA test results as affirmative evidence of
paternity. See notes 262, 275 supra and accompanying text.
"I See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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examination dilemma when the father presents expert testimony
in the responding state. Nor would it be particularly difficult
for the mother to present her affirmative blood test evidence in
the responding state since she has counsel there.
282
The solution to the defendant's potential cross-examination
problem lies in restricting the choice of the testing facility to
those normally used in paternity adjudicatons by the court in
the responding jurisdiction. With this limitation, the defendant's
opportunity for cross-examination of the expert witness is the
same as in a typical intrastate paternity proceeding, and URESA
creates no additional burden.
e. Other Mitigating Factors
A defendant forced to litigate a paternity claim interstate
faces considerable disadvantages which stem from the fact that
he and the mother no longer reside in the same state. However,
many of these disadvantages are identical to those encountered
by a defendant in an action brought by an out-of-state mother
in the defendant's home state.281 Were these the only problems
facing a URESA paternity defendant, it would be difficult to
find fault with the interstate procedures. However, unlike his
intrastate non-URESA counterpart, the URESA defendant faces
the additional difficulty that the mother need never appear for
cross-examination outside her home state.284 Thus, coupled with
the URESA procedural mechanism that effectively denies the
defendant the right to confront and cross-examine the mother
and her witnesses, the interstate nature of the action compounds
the difficult burden already facing most paternity defendants.
By its very nature, the question of filiation carries a high
degree of risk of an erroneous finding of paternity, and this risk
is increased when the parties live in separate states, 285 and is
increased further when the mother invokes the URESA proce-
dure to adjudicate her claim. 2 6 While the risk of an incorrect
282 See id.
283 Both defendants face difficulties in discovering and presenting evidence located
out-of-state. See notes 259-82 supra and accompanying text.
2 See text accompanying note 219 supra.
283 See text accompanying note 153 supra.
2" See text accompanying note 180 supra.
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finding of paternity attributable to the procedure followed is
potentially significant in every URESA case, the risk to a par-
ticular defendant must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
287
The actual harm to each defendant resulting from the interstate
impediments to acquisition and presentation of evidence depends
upon the location of relevant evidence and its importance to the
success or failure of a particular defense. In examining these
two factors, we must initially distinguish between the factual
questions common to most paternity cases and the defenses most
often raised by the putative father.
In all paternity litigation the ultimate "conclusory" fact
288
for determination is whether the defendant fathered the child in
question. To reach this ultimate factual conclusion, the finder
of fact must first establish a series of "historical" facts 289 iden-
tified by asking a series of fundamental questions. First, during
what period of time was the plaintiff biologically capable of
becoming pregnant? Second, did plainfiff and defendant have
intercourse at least once during this fertile period? Third, was
the defendant biologically capable of fathering a child during
the time in question? An affirmative answer to all three suggests
that the defendant may be the biological father of the child, and
a fourth question must then be addressed. Were there other men
with whom the petitioner had intercourse during the gestation
period, and if so, which of the men capable of fathering the
child is actually the father?
Many of the available defenses center around these "histor-
ical" factual quesions, and for most defendants, determining the
2 See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
2n Conclusory facts are those that require the prior determination of other facts.
Here, for example, the finding that the defendant fathered the child is a conclusion that
requires a finding that the defendant and the mother had intercourse during a particular
time and that their intercourse led to the conception of the child. This ultimate question
of "causation" can only be determined with reference to an "historical" fact. See note
289 infra.
Is9 The reference to "historical" fact comes from D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN, supra
note 180, at 4. Historical facts are those facts which took place in the past and trigger
the applicability of the relevant substantive law. Id. In the paternity context, whether
and when intercourse took place are "historical" facts which must be determined as a
necessary basis for the "ultimate" fact in question, i.e., parentage. Thus, for example,
the determination of paternity is premised in intercourse having occurred, an historical
fact which may or may not be disputed.
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gestation period is a crucial means of narrowing the period of
time during which conception could have occurred. 290 Only then
should attention shift to whether and when intercourse took
place. If the defendant admits to having intercourse with the
mother during this period, he will then, as a practical matter,
have the burden of showing that he s not the biological father.
In most instances, this burden will be met only when the de-
fendant proves that he is not physically capable of fathering a
child,291 presents scientific evidence that strongly suggests or
conclusively establishes that he is not the father, 292 or shows that
the mother had intercourse with other males during the gestation
period.293 If the defendant denies having intercourse with the
plaintiff, or denies that intercourse took place during the ges-
tation period, then these two factual issues become the primary
focus of the fact finder's inquiry.
294
While the ultimate factual question in all paternity litigation
is the same, the defenses available to a putative father can vary
significantly. Although not exhaustive, the major and most com-
monly used defenses can be categorized as follows: (1) defenses
See generally S. ScHATKiN, supra note 168, at 718-46 (discussing importance of
the duration of pregnancy in determining whether the defendant is the father of the
child).
29 Vasectomy, sterility or impotence of the father at the time of conception is a
strong defense. See, e.g., E S v. G M S , 520 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (evidence
of husband's bilateral vasectomy and "no sperm" count is clear and convincing and
enough to overcome presumption of legitimacy). See also S. SScHAT , supra note 168,
at 536-55.
-m The use of blood, other genetic, and/or biochemical tests can show that the
defendant is not the father, despite the occurrence of intercourse. See note 259 supra.
21" Of the available "factual" defenses, this is commonly asserted. See note 165
supra and accompanying text. It is also one of the most problematic, because the defense
in reality does not help in determining which of the persons, with whom petitioner had
intercourse, is the biological father. Id. However, the UNs. PARENTAGE ACT, 9A U.L.A.
(1979) [hereinafter cited as U.P.A.], which requires joinder as defendants of men with
whom defendant alleges the mother to have had intercourse, helps resolve this problem.
The U.P.A. also authorizes the use of blood test evidence to help in the final determi-
nation of paternity. U.P.A. § 11, 9A U.L.A. 601-02. A thorough discussion of the
U.P.A. is found in H. KRAusE, supra note 19, at 206-12.
19 This assumes of course that the defendant has not been excluded as the father
by prior blood tests. See note 157 supra. To determine filiation, a fact finder must
conclude that intercourse took place and that it occurred during the period of possible
conception. See cases cited infra note 298.
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of law; 295 (2) scientific defenses;296 (3) medical defenses; 297 and
(4) other factual defenses. 298 For purposes of the present analysis,
the primary distinction between the categories is the extent to
which the ultimate success of the defense is dependent on the
resolution of disputed "historical" facts, particularly the factual
questions highlighted above.
29 Common legal defenses in this category include collateral estoppel/res judicata,
see, e.g., D.L.M. v. V.E.M., 438 N.E.2d 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (support action
barred by res judicata when prior support action found defendant not to be father of
the child); reliance on presumptions that someone other than the defendant is the father,
see, e.g., Estate of Cornelious, 674 P.2d 245 (Cal. 1984) (conclusive presumption that
child of wife cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is child of
the marriage), appeal dismissed sub nom. Hall v. Taylor, 104 S. Ct. 2337 (1984); Cook
v. Perron, 427 So. 2d 499 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (husband presumed to be father when
he married the child's mother knowing she was pregnant) writ denied, 433 So. 2d 1054
(La. 1983); and the statute of limitations, see, e.g., In re W.C., 671 P.2d 621 (Mont.
1983) (five-year statute of limitations upheld); Astemborski v. Susmarski, 451 A.2d 1012
(Pa. 1982) (paternity action dismissed on the basis of six-year statute of limitations in
the face of constitutional challenge), aff'd on remand, 466 A.2d 1018 (Pa. 1983). But
see District of Columbia ex rel. W.J.D. v. E.M., 467 A.2d 457 (D.C. 1983) (two-year
statute of limitations unconstitutional); Commonwealth ex rel. Lepard v. Young, 666
S.W.2d 735 (Ky. 1983) (three-year statute of limitations unconstitutional). See also Child
Support Enforcement Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984)
(mandates that states adopt an 18 year statute of limitations).
" These defenses rest primarily on the use of scientific evidence including blood
test evidence. See note 253 supra and accompanying text. See generally S. ScHIATIN,
supra note 168, at 100-02. For a discussion of lie detector evidence, see id. at 469-84.
' See note 291 supra for a discussion of medical conditions as a defense to alleged
paternity.
These defenses rely primarily on resolution of "historical" factual questions,
see note 289 supra, which are often disputed and often involve credibility. These defenses
include absence of intercourse between the parties and use of contraception by either or
both parties, a factor usually not relevant alone but important in conjunction with other
considerations such as intercourse with others, period of gestation, etc. See, e.g., Renee
v. William , 360 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), aff'd mem., 385 N.Y.S.2d 763
(1976). In recent years men have tried to assert fraud and deceit as a defense by alleging
that the mother lied about her use of contraceptives. This defense, to date, has been
uniformly rejected by the courts. See, e.g., Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618
(Ct. App. 1980). Men have also asserted that intercourse occurred outside the period of
gestation. See, e.g., Beaman v. Hedrick, 255 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. App. 1970) (verdict
against the weight of the evidence when period of gestation would have been only 202
days); State ex rel. Isham v. Mullally, 112 N.W.2d 701 (Wis. 1961) (judgment reversed
when gestation period was 309 days and no evidence of prolonged pregnancy or delayed
birth). Another asserted defense is that the mother had intercourse with men other than
the defendant during the period of possible conception. See H. KRAUSE, supra note 19,
at 104-10. See also Sass, The Defense of Multiple Access (Exceptio Plurium Concuben-
tiom) In Paternity Suits: A Comparative Analysis, 51 TuL. L. REv. 468 (1976-77).
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By and large, the first three categories of defenses do not
rely on the resolution of disputed facts for their success. For
example, the legal defenses of res judicata and statute of limi-
tations may require the resolution of an essential fact-such as
the birth date of the child299 or the nature of the previous judicial
determination. °0 However, these essential facts are often not in
dispute, and if in dispute, resolution will rarely depend on the
credibility of the parties. The same is true for medical defenses
based on the sterility or vasectomy of the defendant and for
scientific defenses which rely on blood or genetic testing or other
genetic abnormalities. 10' Because the mother's testimony and
credibility will rarely have an impact on these defenses, 302 the
defendant's inability to adequately cross-examine the mother in
person is not significant. Similarly, the defendant's successful
presentation of these defenses will rarely depend upon the dis-
covery and acquisition of unknown out-of-state evidence. 30 1 In
these cases, the Act's existing procedures are adequate and their
use will rarely increase the risk of an erroneous determination
of paternity.
These categories of defenses should be contrasted with the
more "traditional" factual defenses often associated with pa-
ternity litigaton, such as intercourse with males other than the
defendant 304 or no intercourse with the defendant during the
period of gestation.30 5 These defenses rely on the credibility of
both parties and their respective witnesses. In these situations
Normally, the statute of limitation begins to run from the birth of the child.
See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6704 (Purdon 1982) (provides that actions to
establish paternity must be "commenced within six years of the birth of the child").
0 Since parentage of a child is an issue not necessarily decided in advance, the
court in the subsequent action must determine whether the issue was raised and decided
in the prior action. See, e.g., McNeece v. McNeece, 562 P.2d 767 (Colo. Ct. App.
1977).
"I There can be factual disputes in the context of these defenses. However, the
focus will be on the reliability and conduct of the tests and the interpretation of the test
results-all issues that are resolved by focusing on the expert witness and not on the
parties.
m See note 301 supra.
303 Defendant's success will generally depend upon the strength of his evidence and
the credibility of his expert witness. Defendant's access to experts is usually not hampered
in the URESA context and the data from which the expert's opinion is drawn should
also be readily available. See text accompanying note 279 supra.
3 See note 298 supra.
305 Id.
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cross-examination of the mother will be crucial °6 and the two-
state deposition procedure is inadequate to insure a fair and just
determination of the issues.
30 7
The nature of the defense asserted by the defendant is an
important mitigating consideration in determining the actual
prejudicial effect that distance has on the fundamental fairness
of the URESA paternity proceeding. It is, however, only one of
two factors which impact upon this determination. Another is
the location of important factual evidence in relation to the
defendant's residence at the time the lawsuit is initiated. 30 8 The
importance of this factor can best be appreciated by examining
three different scenarios which are likely in the URESA context.
Case 1
In this scenario we assume that State A is the birthing
jurisdiction. 309 The mother and child remain in State A while the
putative father, sometime subsequent to the conception, moves
to State B. Since the parties now reside in different states, the
mother has three theoretical options to obtain support from the
absent father. Because the conception and birth took place in
State A, the mother might attempt to obtain long-arm jurisdic-
10 In discussing the relationship between these defenses and cross-examination,
Schatkin is of the view that "[c]ross-examination is nevertheless the only method avail-
able to counsel to shake the court's conviction that the mother is telling the truth as to
the paternity of her child." S. ScHATmN, supra note 168, at 749 (emphasis in original).
Credibility of the mother on this issue is crucial and the defendant will likely need the
benefit of cross-examination to address the issue. See note 220 supra.
10 Because of the nature of the issues, see note 298 supra, and the importance of
cross-examination to these issues, see notes 220, 306 supra, the defendant must be able
to conduct live cross-examination of the mother. If the defendant is without the means
to conduct cross-examination in the home state of the mother, the mother should have
to appear in the responding state. Cross-examination by written question is an inadequate
substitution in this situation.
1 Cross-examination of the mother can be crucial to the defendant's case. See
notes 220, 306 supra. Since it is naive to think that the mother will admit to the disputed
fact, other evidence which corroborates defendant's "version" of the facts or which
contradicts the mother's assertions may be equally important to the success of defend-
ant's case. Potentially important witnesses include, for example, friends, relatives, neigh-
bors, welfare case workers, and others to whom the mother may have made admissions.
Other relevant evidence includes hospital birth records, mother's medical records, birth
certificate, and welfare records.
30 See text accompanying note 183 supra.
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tion over the father in her home state. 310 If she successfully
acquires long-arm jurisdicton over the putative father, he must
defend the action in the home state of the mother.31' There is
an initial burden to the defendant because he will have to travel
and obtain counsel in a distant state. However, since most of
the important evidence remains in the forum state, the defendant
should face no additional burden in finding or presenting excul-
patory evidence.
Without long-arm jurisdiction, the mother must either travel
to State B to institute suit or begin a URESA action in her home
state. If she chooses to travel to the father's state she can obtain
personal jurisdiction over him and litigate there. While both
parties face a burden in litigating in State B which has little
relationship with the cause of action, the defendant's due process
rights are not transgressed merely because of the difficulty he
may face in acquiring and presenting evidence that is located in
another state. Traditionally, the plaintiff has the choice of forum,
and the defendant can be forced to defend an action in his home
state. 3
12
In most cases, the mother will choose the URESA action to
avoid the necessity of traveling to State B. While this is more
desirable for the defendant than having to defend in State A,
the URESA action presents difficulties in the acquisition and
presentation of evidence still located in State A.313 These prob-
lems, however, are no more severe than those he faces if the
mother chooses to travel to his home state to litigate.3t 4 More
significant is the defendant's inability to cross-examine the mother
and her supporting witnesses in State A when the nature of the
defense requires assessment of their credibility. 35 Here, the un-
310 See note 10 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of a state's jurisdiction
over the putative father.
"I This assumes that jurisdiction in this context is consistent with due process. See
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (defendant must have
"minimum contacts" with the forum state).
312 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
', See text accompanying notes 180-99 supra.
114 There may be discovery advantages in defending a URESA action rather than
an action initiated in the defendant's home state. See text accompanying notes 193-99
supra.
" See note 307 supra and accompanying text.
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fairness to the defendant results from the combined effects of
his inability to cross-examine and the impediments to acquiring
and presenting out-of-state evidence.
Case 2
In this scenario the birthing jurisdiction remains State A.
However, here the mother and child move to State B while the
putative father remains in State A. Unlike Case 1, the mother
will be unable to assert long-arm jurisdiction over the defendant
in her home state. 316 Thus, this mother must either travel back
to State A to institute suit or rely on URESA.
If the action is commenced in State A, the defendant faces
no problems in defending the suit. The relevant evidence remains
in his home state, and as a result, he should experience no
unique problem in either presenting affirmative evidence or in
cross-examining the mother or her witnesses.
The URESA action is also less problematic for the defendant
than in Case 1 since he does not face the problems associated
with acquiring and presenting out-of-state evidence.317 While the
mother's testimony will still be offered in her home state with
the resultant cross-examination problem, it is unlikely that she
will have any additional evidence to offer in her home state
since it is likely that the mother's supporting testimonial evi-
dence, if any, will be located and presented in State A. Thus,
the real prejudice to the putative father in this situation depends
primarily on the importance that cross-examination alone plays
in the final determination of paternity.3 18
Case 3
Unlike our prior two examples, in this scenario neither party
remains in State A, the birthing jurisdiction. We will assume
"6 The mere presence of the mother and child is insufficient to acquire jurisdiction
over the putative father who has no other contacts with the state. Cf. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310.
" The kind of evidence normally relevant to the issue in the paternity case usually
remains in the birthing jurisdiction. See note 308 supra.
" See notes 302-07 supra and accompanying text.
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that the putative father moves to State B while the mother and
child move to State C. The mother cannot obtain long-arm
jurisdiction in State C,31 9 and is therefore forced to sue in State
B or use URESA. If suit is brought in State B, both parties face
the burden of acquiring and presenting out-of-state evidence.320
Again, however, the choice of forum is traditionally the moth-
er's, and the putative father cannot complain about litigating in
his home state.
The URESA action presents problems for both parties. The
relevant evidence is likely located in State A, which is no longer
the residence of either party. Like Case 1, the mother's testimony
and that of her witnesses will be offered in her home state, with
resulting cross-examination problems for the defendant. 32' Fur-
ther, difficulties in the affirmative presentation of exculpatory
evidence are again evident.
322
Thus, when the defense raised is not dependent on the res-
olution of disputed facts, the actual prejudice resulting from the
use of the URESA two-state lawsuit may be significantly less
than that encountered when the same defendant relies upon a
factual defense or a defense that is dependent upon the credi-
bility of the parties. Further, the analysis must consider both
the location of the relevant out-of-state evidence vis-a-vis the
defendant's residence and the likelihood that this evidence is
necessary for an accurate determination of filiation.
IV. TOWARD A STANDARD
The due process implications are potentially significant in
every case in which the defendant asserts non-paternity as a
defense to a URESA support action. Both the father and the
child have significant and fundamental interests in the accuracy
of the proceeding.2 3 The nature of the interstate proceeding,
coupled with the inherent problems of proof in paternity adju-
dication, generally escalates the potential risk of an erroneous
"I See note 316 supra.
311 See text accompanying notes 180-99 supra.
321 See text accompanying notes 219-52 supra.
'2 See text accompanying notes 200-17 supra.
"3 See notes 144-49 supra and accompanying text.
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adjudication.3 24 However, these increased risks should not sug-
gest the need for a wholesale abandonment of the two-state
lawsuit in the paternity context.
Because the filiation issue is so critical to the child and
because of the difficulty in establishing paternity when one or
more of the parties resides in a different state, whenever possible
courts should hear the paternity defense as part of the URESA
support action. Courts must recognize that without the interstate
proceeding, the establishment of paternity for some children will
be impossible. 325 Given the need for accuracy, however, defend-
ants must be given the benefit of procedural protections con-
sistent with due process.
326
In seeking to articulate a standard, we begin with the knowl-
edge that there is no simple solution to this complex problem.
To succeed, any workable approach must accommodate the im-
portant and sometimes conflicting interests of the parties, as well
as consider the availability of procedural devices which might
reduce the inherent risk of error to an acceptable level. 327 Our
goal is to delineate an approach which the responding URESA
court can apply to efficiently and effectively assess which cases
should be adjudicated and which should be adjourned.
A. Preliminary Considerations
The defendant will normally raise the non-paternity defense
at a fairly early stage of the URESA proceeding. Once the
plaintiff submits the proper transmittal papers and acquires jur-
isdicton over the defendant, the matter is set for an initial
hearing in the responding state,32 and it is at this point that the
defendant generally raises the non-paternity defense.
It is important to note that initially the court has only the
mother's petition and affidavit for support before it, neither of
which is admissible in evidence without the putative father's
:2 See text beginning at note 153 supra.
21 The child's dilemma in attempting to establish paternity is identical to that
facing the mother prior to the passage of URESA when she sought to collect support
from an out-of-state father. See notes 4-19 supra and accompanying text.
36 See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text.
'2' See text accompanying notes 128-29 supra.
I' See notes 21-30 supra and accompanying text.
URESA
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
consent.329 One commentator has suggested that this poses only
a small problem in most URESA support cases since the mother
can meet her burden of production and proof by calling the
defendant "as-of-cross" and eliciting a series of admissions. 3 0
This procedure requires the defendant to testify first and varies
from the customary order of proof at trial. In the usual support
case where the only issue is the amount of support due, this
irregularity is insignificant. 3 1 Once the defendant denies patern-
ity, however, the prosecuting attorney must not be allowed to
examine him further on the subject and the matter should cease
until the court determines its course of action.
3 2
Once the defense is asserted, the court faces the threshold
"jurisdictional" question-whether to hear or dismiss the pa-
ternity action. The determination can be made at this stage.
However, the more desirable course of action is to delay the
decision until there has been an opportunity to fully assess the
due process implications. 33
If the defendant appears at this initial hearing without rep-
resentation, the court should ascertain his willingness and ability
to obtain counsel. The complexity of the substantive issues,
coupled with the additional procedural entanglements of the
interstate proceeding, makes representation necessary. When the
defendant desires and can afford private counsel, he should be
given the opportunity to retain counsel before any further action
is taken.
329 See note 34 supra.
33o See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
331 Id.
332 Without counsel, the defendant is at an obvious disadvantage and he should not
be compelled to testify concerning his assertions of non-paternity until he has had the
opportunity to consult with counsel. See note 338 infra and accompanying text.
333 This "jurisdictional" decision in states which have adopted RURESA § 27
requires a determination that one or both of the parties are not necessary to the
determination of paternity. See RURESA § 27, 9A U.L.A. 730. Use of the procedural
due process standard insures that the adjudication will not take place in a forum that
deprives the defendant of a "meaningful opportunity to be heard." See note 126 supra
and accompanying text. The use of this standard also protects the "effective-litigation
values" that facilitate proper functioning of our adjudication process and underlie the
excesses of personal jurisdiction based on notions of "fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316-17 (citations omitted). See Ratner,
Procedural Due Process and Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: (a) Effective-Litigation Values
vs. The Territorial Imperative (b) The Uniform Custody Jurisdiction Act, 74 Nw. U. L.
REv. 363, 366-67 (1980).
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If the defendant is indigent and unable to afford represen-
tation, counsel should be appointed if the proceeding is to con-
tinue. In those states in which courts have held that due process
requires the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in
paternity cases, appointment in the URESA context logically
follows. 3 34 Jurisdictions not requiring the appointment of counsel
must reconsider their approach in light of the additional burden
facing the defendant in the URESA interstate proceeding. With-
out counsel, the nature of the paternity action, coupled with the
increased procedural problems of the two-state lawsuit, creates
an unreasonably high risk of error.335 The state's interest in not
incurring the expense of providing counsel, while significant,
336
cannot take precedence over the fundamental interests of the
child and father.337 Given this high risk of error and the fun-
damental importance of the interests at stake, no URESA pa-
ternity case should continue in the absence of appointed counsel.
B. Pre-Trial Proceedings
Upon the appointment or retention of counsel, the court
should set the case for an initial conference to discuss the nature
of the case and to establish the necessary procedural guidelines
for the litigation. 38 At that meeting the parties should be queried
concerning potentially dispositive motions. For example, when
the defendant asserts that the action is barred by the statute of
limitations,33 9 res judicata/collateral estoppel 43 or some other
"' See note 160 supra. The URESA defendant requires procedural protections
which, at a minimum, are coextensive with those provided to defendants in intrastate
paternity actions. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
33 The absence of counsel compounds the risk of an erroneous finding of paternity.
The procedural problems surrounding discovery, see text accompanying notes 180-99
supra, presentation of evidence, see text accompanying notes 200-17 supra, cross-exam-
ination of the mother and the witnesses, see text accompanying notes 219-52 supra,
availability of blood tests and presentation of test results at trial, see text accompanying
notes 253-82 supra, are too complex to be handled effectively in the interstate context
without counsel.
136 See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
"1 See text accompanying notes 134-46 supra.
131 To succeed, this procedural due process approach to resolving the question of
when a court should hear the paternity defense requires early, active judicial involvement
in the management of the litigation. See generally, Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HAgv.
L. Ray. 376 (1982).
" See note 295 supra.
'O Id.
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legal theory based upon the construction of a statute, the court
should decide the legal question. Similarly, the court should hear
claims of the mother-such as collateral estoppel or res judi-
cata-which would act to bar the defense of non-paternity.34'
Since these legal claims will rarely require the determination of
disputed fact, 342 courts should make use of formal motion prac-
tice to decide the claims without need for an evidentiary hearing.
By preliminarily accepting jurisdiction to determine legal issues
potentially dispositive of the entire case, the court can resolve
the claims that have little or no merit. In contrast with the
approach outlined in section 27 of RURESA, 343 frivolous cases
will be effectively ended rather than dismissed without binding
adjudication.344
Only a small percentage of cases can be resolved at this early
stage of the proceeding. If neither side presents potentially dis-
positive motions, the court should then consider the question of
the availability of blood or genetic tests. Recent advances in
blood and other scientific tests offer a real step toward alleviat-
ing the proof problems associated with paternity litigation.
34
-
When the defendant is conclusively shown not to be the father
of the child in question, the action can be dismissed without
procedural prejudice to either side. Even when not dispositive,
blood test results are very reliable evidence346 which can signifi-
cantly reduce the risk of error in the formal adjudication. In
addition, the results of blood tests may spur the parties to
realistically assess the relative strength of their claims and thereby
greatly facilitate resolution by settlement. 347
34 See, e.g., McNeece v. McNeece, 562 P.2d 767; Luedtke v. Koopsma, 303 N.W.2d
112.
3" See notes 299-300 supra and accompanying text.
-3 RURESA § 27, 9A U.L.A. 730.
'" See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
-4 See text accompanying notes 253-55 supra.
"4 See notes 272-74 supra and accompanying text.
34 See generally Havighurst, Settlement of Paternity Claims, 1976 Asuz. ST. L.J.
461. The headnote to this Article explains: "Professor Havighurst discusses five varia-
tions that frequently appear in paternity statutes which authorize judicial approval of
paternity settlements. He points out many of the problems attendant on judicial approval
provisions and intimates several solutions after taking account of the policy of finality
and its conflict with a mother and child's need of support." Id. at 461.
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If blood tests are inadmissable under state law or are not
provided for an indigent defendant, the court should be reluctant
to adjudicate the paternity interstate. The URESA procedure
and the proof problems in the absence of blood tests tip the
constitutional scale in defendant's favor. 348 A court should con-
sider adjudication without blood test evidence only when the
mother and her witnesses appear in the responding state to testify
and only when the defendant encounters no other serious prob-
lems in presenting his defense.
34 9
Where the case is to continue subsequent to testing, the trial
court should consider the defendant's need for and ability to
conduct pre-trial discovery.35 0 Judicial involvement in the discov-
ery process at this early stage is necessary, because it allows the
court to determine the relevance, importance, and discoverability
of potential evidence located outside the responding state. If
necessary, the court can coordinate and help simplify the dis-
covery process and thus lessen the burden of two-state litigation
on the defendant. 35' Any difficulty faced by the defendant in
attempting to conduct discovery will alone not be grounds for
the refusal of jurisdiction. However, it should be taken into
account as one factor in the court's final assessment of jurisdic-
tion.
C. The Final "Jurisdictional" Decision
The court's final decision to hear the paternity claim should
await a point in the pre-trial stage of the litigation when the
court will have available the necessary data to determine the
actual harm to the defendant in having to litigate the paternity
case interstate. This assessment requires the court's consideration
141 The risk of an erroneous determination of paternity is at least as great as that
in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). See id. at 16 (refusal of state to provide blood
tests for indigent defendant denies defendant a "meaningful opportunity to be heard"
in violation of the requirement of "fundamental fairness").
'41 Even when the mother appears to testify, absent any blood test evidence, the
risk of an erroneous determination is high. See text accompanying notes 165-78 supra.
The risk may increase as a result of interstate procedural problems that affect the quality
of the adjudicatory process. See notes 179-99 supra and accompanying text.
"0 See note 180 supra and accompanying text.
' See Resnick, supra note 338, at 378-79.
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of the nature of the defendant's defense, including the extent to
which the mother's credibility is at issue. The court must also
determine the location of important defense evidence and the
extent to which the presentation of the evidence at trial is sig-
nificantly impaired by the interstate nature of the action. This
final decision should not be made until the parties are in a
position to discuss the merits of their respective cases and can
outline with specificity the disputed factual issues.
At this stage, potentially dispositive defenses should have
been presented by way of motion. The remaining defenses rely
primarily on the determination of disputed facts. Some factual
defenses will be difficult to adequately present in the URESA
context and others will not. The key consideration is the extent
to which the defendant's ability to present an adequate factual
defense is compromised because of the two-state proceeding.
For example, when the defense asserted is based on the
defendant's physical or medical problem, 35 2 the credibility of the
mother is usually not an issue. 353 The defendant may admit
intercourse, but claim sterility, impotence or prior vasectomy.3 54
These are defenses that rest primarily on the defendant's credi-
bility and the strength of his medical testimony. Since the moth-
er's credibility is largely irrelevant in these defenses, there is no
great need for her live in-court testimony and cross-examina-
tion.3 55 In these cases, the URESA deposition procedure is ade-
quate even when the defendant has no funds to conduct cross-
examination, and courts should not be reluctant to adjudicate
paternity unless the defendant is severely prejudiced in his ability
to present important out-of-state evidence. 35 6 For example, a
defendant may assert as a defense differences in racial charac-
teristics between himself, the mother and the child. Scientific
evidence is necessary for successful presentation of the defense,
and that evidence can be presented easily at trial by expert
testimony. However, the success of the defense may require the
112 See note 291 supra.
13" See notes 301-02 supra and accompanying text.
35 See note 291 supra.
311 See note 298 supra.
3' Here the substitute procedure, cross-examination by written questions, is suffi-
cient. See notes 250-53 supra and accompanying text.
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presence of the parties, especially the child, to allow the court
to discern the existence or nonexistence of certain racial char-
acteristics. 3 7 The presence of mother and child in the responding
state may be important to an accurate resolution of this defense
despite the fact that the defense is essentially "scientific" in
nature. 358 Even here, however, a court should be careful to
ascertain whether the burden is any worse than that which results
when a mother chooses to institute suit directly in the defend-
ant's home state.
Cases in which the mother's credibility plays an important
role require the presence of the mother in the home state of the
father or actual cross-examination of the mother in her home
state. When the parties dispute having intercourse, or dispute
when intercourse occurred, or when the defendant asserts access
by others, 359 effective cross-examination of both parties is crucial
to a fair and accurate determination and the defendant must be
given the real opportunity to cross-examine the mother.1
60
The court may require the mother and her witnesses to testify
in the responding state. Alternatively, the court may allow the
two-state deposition procedure to be used as long as the defend-
ant has a "real opportunity" to conduct cross-examination in
the mother's home state.3 61 Both alternatives raise a thorny ques-
tion concerning the allocation of cost: who must bear the burden
of financing the mother's trip to the responding state or pay to
assure that the defendant has adequate representation in the
initiating state to conduct cross-examination of the mother?
Initially, the court should look to the mother to determine
if she has the means to assume the financial burden since she
chose the forum. If she does, then she should finance her ap-
pearance in the father's home state when necessary or assume
the cost of having her deposition taken in her home state. 62 In
most cases, the mother will not be able to assume the financial
I" See note 296 supra.
353 Id.
119 See note 298. See also accompanying notes 304-07 supra.
Mo See notes 306-08 supra and accompanying text.
MI The defendant must have the economic ability to conduct the out-of-state cross-
examination. See note 221 supra and accompanying text.
"6 Assumption of this cost would include prepayment, if necessary, of the defend-
ant's cost of attending the deposition. See notes 245-48 supra and accompanying text.
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cost, and the court should then turn to the father. In either case,
the court should retain discretion to tax these expenses as costs
to assure that the party most able can assume the initial eco-
nomic burden without necessarily shouldering the final cost. 63
In the vast majority of cases, neither party will have the
money necessary to properly conduct the litigation. When this
occurs, the court should not be reluctant to look for financial
assistance from the governmental unit aligned with the mother
or from either of the two states involved in the litigation. Such
an arrangement is not unprecedented. When the defendant is
indigent, many states incur the initial cost of blood tests364 or
appointed counsel . 65 These expenses are often taxed as costs of
the litigation to be borne ultimately by the losing party.36 This
same approach can be effectively employed in the URESA pa-
ternity context.
Which of the two states involved in the two-state action
should finance these expenditures? Both states have an interest
in the action. However, when the mother is a recipient of state
welfare benefits, the initiating state has a direct economic interest
in the outcome.367 Given this direct economic gain, the initiating
16 In some states the power to allocate costs is statutory. See, e.g., Omo Rv.
CODE ANN. § 3111.14 (Page 1983) which provides that a court:
may order reasonable fees for experts, and other costs of the action and
pretrial proceedings, including genetic tests, to be paid by the parties in
proportions and at times determined by the court. The court may order
the proportion of any party to be paid by the court, and, before or after
payment by any party or the county, may order all or part of the fees and
costs to be taxed as costs in the action.
In Kentucky the courts' power is limited to assessing these expenses against the
obligor. See Ky. REv. STAT. § 407.220 (1984) which states:
An initiating court shall not require payment of either a filing fee or other
costs from the obligee but may request the responding court to collect fees
and costs from the obligor. A responding court shall not require payment
of a filing fee or other costs from the obligee but it may direct that all
fees and costs requested by the initiating court and incurred in this state
when acting -as a responding state, including fees for filing of pleadings,
service of process, seizure of property, stenographic or duplication service,
or other service supplied to the obligor, be paid in whole or in part by the
obligor. The costs or fees do not have priority over amounts due to the
obligee.
314 See note 161 supra.
"I See note 160 supra.
"6 See note 363 supra.
367 See notes 150-51 supra and accompanying text.
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state should initially bear the financial burden associated with
the URESA action. However, when neither state immediately
stands to directly gain economically, 368 the cost of the litigation
should be shared equally.
While the states involved have legitimate financial con-
cerns, 369 these concerns are not significant enough to outweigh
the fundamental private interests involved.3 70 In certain cases,
the interests of the child and the putative father require that
there be provision for the cost of transporting the mother to the
responding state or of financing the defendant's attendance at
her deposition in the initiating state. Absent the defendant's
ability to effectively confront and cross-examine the mother, the
court should decline "jurisdiction" and terminate the action.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the procedural problems associated
with interstate adjudications of paternity conducted in the con-
text of a URESA support action. It has suggested procedures
and standards that allow for continued use of the URESA action
while simultaneously protecting the due process rights of men
who may be falsely accused of paternity. Both putative father
and child have significant and fundamental interests in the ac-
curacy of the URESA adjudicatory proceeding which deserve
constitutional protection. The procedural scheme of the inter-
state proceeding compounds the proof problems inherent in pa-
ternity litigation generally, and significantly escalates the potential
risk of an erroneous determination of paternity. The suggested
standard attempts to preserve the effective litigation values which
underlie the notion of procedural due process by focusing on
the interstate impediments to the discovery, acquisition and pres-
entation of factual evidence necessary to a fair adjudication.
The approach distinguishes and categorizes available defenses by
their level of fact intensity in an attempt to determine the real
prejudice to a defendant which results from the use of the
- When the child is not a recipient of AFDC, the initiating state does not stand
to immediately gain financially from the determination of paternity and the resulting
support order.
- See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
"o See notes 139-46 supra and accompanying text.
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URESA two-state lawsuit. Also of concern is the location of
necessary evidence in relation to the home state of the defendant.
By accommodating the important and often conflicting interests
of the parties and by stressing the availability of procedural
devices which can reduce the inherent risk of error to acceptable
levels, the standard presented attem-ts to offer an efficient and
effective approach to determine when and under what procedural
circumstances a court should adjudicate paternity as part of an
interstate URESA support action.
